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INTRODUCTION
In the 1952 House Report on the Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA"),' Congressman Emanuel Celler announced, "[o]n the one
hand we publicly pronounce the equality of all peoples.... on the
other hand, in our immigration laws, we embrace in practice these
very theories we abhor and verbally condemn." Even today, immi-
gration continues to be one of the few areas of law where Congress,
with the consent of the Court, has succeeded in circumventing the
very standard of constitutional protection it claims to respect.3 Al-
1. H.R. REP. No. 82-1365 (1952).
2. Id. at 1751 (statement of Rep. Celler) (referring to the inconsistencies between Con-
gress' explicit rejection of discrimination based on race and national origin on the one hand,
and its continued endorsement of a discriminatory quota system established in the 1924 Immi-
gration and Nationality Act on the other). Cellar explained that of the statutorily available
154,000 annual quotas, 109,400 of them were allotted to England, Ireland, and Germany (many
of which were unused), while most of the other countries in eastern and southern Europe were
allotted less than 7,000 per country. See id. The anomaly Cellar pointed out with respect to
discrimination by ethnic origin was arguably abolished by the 1965 Amendment to the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of 1952. See Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Star. 911,
911-12 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1994)) (replacing the quota system based
on nationality or birth place with immigration preferences based on other factors including
familial relationships with American citizens and employment skills). Sex-based discrimina-
tion, however, continues to exist in the Immigration and Nationality Act. See infra note 26 and
accompanying text (indicating gender-based classifications are still contained in sections 101
and 309 of the Immigration and NationalityAct).
3. See H.R. REP. No. 82-1365, at 1654. Congress explained its authority to regulate immi-
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though often expressing disapproval of certain facially discriminatory
immigration laws,4 the Court has repeatedly cloaked its reluctance to
intervene 5 in these matters with rhetoric regarding foreign policy im-
plications 6 the political nature of immigration decisions7 and the
plenary power of Congress."
gration:
The powers and authority of the United States, as an attribute of sovereignty, either to
prohibit or regulate immigration of aliens are plenary and Congress may choose such
agencies as it pleases to carry out whatever policy or rule of exclusion it may adopt,
and so long as such agencies do not transcend limits of authority... their judgment is
not open to challenge or review by courts.
Id. (citing Kaorn Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903)) (emphasis added).
It is unclear, howeverjust what Congress' "limits of authority" are in making immigra-
tion policy. Arguably, the Fifth Amendment does not place meaningful constraints on Con-
gress' law-making power in the immigration context. As Justice O'Connor recently noted, im-
migration law is "an area where Congress frequently must base its decisions on generalizations
about groups of people," and thus Congress need not provide evidence tojustify every statutory
classification challenged under the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. See Miller v. Al-
bright, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1446 (1998) (O'ConnorJ, concurring) (citation omitted).
4. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 216 (1953) ("Whatever
our individual estimate of that policy and the fears on which it rests, respondent's right to enter
the United States depends on the congressional will, and courts cannot substitute their judg-
ment for the legislative mandate.") (citation omitted); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531-32
(1954) ("We are not prepared to deem ourselves wiser or more sensitive to human rights than
our predecessors ... and must therefore under our constitutional system recognize congres-
sional power in dealing with aliens...."). But see Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens
From Discriminatory Treatment by the National Government, 1977Sup. CT. REV. 275,324 (noting that
ironically, one week before Galvan v. Press was decided, the Supreme Court overruled the
landmark case Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ. of
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), thereby abolishing the "separate but equal" racial segregation pol-
icy in this country). Certainly, the Court, when dealing with racial discrimination, deemed it-
self "wiser and more sensitive to human rights" than its predecessors. See Rosberg, supra, at
324.
5. The term "intervene" in this context refers to the Court's refusal to apply traditional
levels of constitutional scrutiny or any scrutiny at all to immigration laws.
6. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 796 (1977) (noting immigration issues often involve
relations with foreign powers, and therefore usually are not appropriate matters for the courts
to decide); Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530 (finding that Congress' power to regulate the admission and
deportation of aliens is essential to foreign relations and national security; thus, deporting ali-
ens who were former Communist party members is within Congress' discretion regardless of
whether it violates the First Amendment in a non-immigration context).
7. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 796 (noting that the same reasons that prevent the Judiciary from
reviewing political questions, also mandate a limited review of immigration matters); Harisia-
des v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587-89 (1952) (noting that the classification of aliens invokes
political and economic concerns that are best left to Congress or the Executive Branch). As
one scholar noted, "[tihe Court is undoubtedly fearful of becoming enmeshed in the process
of formulating immigration policy. Too much judicial scrutiny could bring down the entire
system of intricate and interconnected rules" governing the admission of aliens. See Rosberg,
supra note 4, at 325.
8. See Fallo, 430 U.S. at 796 ("The conditions of entry for every alien, the particular
classes of aliens that shall be denied entry altogether, the basis for determining such classifica-
tion... [are] matters solely for the responsibility of the Congress and wholly outside the power
of this Court to control.") (citation omitted); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972)
(stating that Congress has always had the power to enact laws governing the admission of aliens
without judicial interference); Azizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130, 1133 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting
that even though the right to marry is considered a substantive due process right, because
Congress' power over immigration is plenary, an immigration statute affecting marriages must
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Maintaining this hands-off approach to immigration, in 1996, the
D.C. Circuit in Miller v. Christopher, 9 rejected a gender-based equal
protection challenge to section 309 of the Immigration and National-
ity Act.10 Section 309 makes it substantially more difficult for the ille-
gitimate children of American fathers to become United States citi-
zens than the illegitimate children of American mothers." In 1998, a
sharply divided Supreme Court in Miller v. Albright,12 also rejected the
equal protection challenge to section 309. s Ironically, the Court's
decision came just two years after United States v. Virginia,4 a land-
mark gender-based equal protection decision ordering the Virginia
Military Institute to admit women to its historically male-only col-
lege. is
The Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Albright, however, is so
severely splintered that it fails to set any meaningful precedent re-
garding gender-based immigration law. Justice Stevens, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, were the only members of the Court to up-
hold the constitutionality of section 309's sex-based classifications on
substantive equal protection grounds. 6 Justices O'Connor and Ken-
nedy concurred in result, but only because they believed the peti-
tioner, an illegitimate child of an American citizen-father, did not
have standing to raise a gender-based discrimination claim when the
statute technically only classified American parents (and not their
children) on the basis of gender. 7 Justices Scalia and Thomas also
merely be "facially legitimate" to withstand a constitutional challenge); see also David M. Grable,
Note, Personhood Under the Due Process Clause: A Constitutional Analysis of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 820, 838 (1998) (noting that
.commentators observe that the plenary power doctrine has created a chasm between immigra-
tion law and the larger body of constitutional due process law") (citation omitted).
9. 96 F.3d 1467, 1472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1996), affd on other grounds sub nom. Miller v. Albright,
118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998).
10. SeeImmigration and Nationality Act § 309, 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1994).
11. See8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (4) (1994) (stating that, among other things, an alien child born
out of wedlock to an alien mother and American father must be legitimized by his American
father before reaching 18 years of age in order to qualify for citizenship); infra notes 45-46
(describing the additional statutory burdens that alien children born out of wedlock to an
American father and alien mother must meet in order to become United States citizens).
12. 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1432 (1998) (Stevens,J.,joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist);id. at 1442
(O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Justice Kennedy); id. at 1446 (Scalia, J., concurring,
joined by Justice Thomas); id. at 1449 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Souter and
Breyer); id. at 1455 (BreyerJ., dissenting, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg).
13. See 118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998), affgon other grounds sub nom. Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d
1467 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
14. 518 U.S. 515, (1996).
15. See id. at 557-58.
16. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1432 (holding that the gender-based classifications in section
309 "are well supported by valid government interests .... [and are] neither arbitrary or invidi-
ous").
17. See id. at 1442-43 (O'ConnorJ, concurring) (stating that because the statute does not
accord differential treatment based on sex to sons and daughters of American citizens, the peti-
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concurred in result, but only because they believed that Congress,
and not the Court, had power to grant the petitioner citizenship.'8
Therefore, Justices Scalia and Thomas argued that the petitioner did
not have standing, and that her complaint should have been dis-
missed.' Finally, Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, dissenting in
two separate opinions, reasoned that section 309 is unconstitutional
because its gender-based classifications violate the Equal Protection
Clause.20 The incredibly divided decision of the Miller Court indi-
cates that there are many unresolved issues regarding the nexus be-
tween immigration law and gender-based equal protection law.
Therefore, rather than focus on the five widely divergent opinions of
the Supreme Court justices in Miller v. Albright, this Comment exam-
ines earlier gender-based immigration cases leading up to that deci-
sion.2' Relevant analysis of the Miller v. Albright decision, however,
will be included (primarily in footnotes) throughout the Comment.
Part I of this Comment explores the tension between immigration
policies, which the Court is reluctant to review at all,2 and gender-
based legislation, which the Court mandates must be reviewed under
heightened judicial scrutiny23 Part II provides a background to key
cases involving gender-based immigration law, and explains the per-
tinent competing interests, including whether aliens seeking to im-
migrate are entitled to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment
of the Constitution.
tioner, a daughter, cannot raise a gender-based discrimination claim).
18. See id. at 1446 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The complaint must be dismissed because the
Court has no power to provide the relief requested: conferral of citizenship on a basis other
than that prescribed by Congress.").
19. See id.
20. See id. at 1449 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) (stating that section 309"classifies unconstitu-
tionally on the basis of gender in determining the capacity of a parent to qualify a child for citi-
zenship"); id. at 1463 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding section 309 unconstitutional because
there is "'no exceedingly persuasive' justification for the gender-based distinctions that the
statute draws").
21. Justice Ginsburg, dissenting in Miller, discussed the history of the largely discriminatory
treatment of foreign-born children of American citizens. See id. at 1450-54. Justice Ginsburg
focused on immigration legislation that existed throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries that only allowed children of married American fathers and foreign mothers (and
not children of married American mothers and foreign fathers) to become citizens. See id. at
1450-51. Most of the laws thatJustice Ginsburg referred to were amended in 1934 in an effort
to promote equality between American men and women in matters of citizenship. See id. at
1452. She partook in this historical analysis to show that"[t]he history of the treatment of chil-
dren born abroad to United States citizens parents counsels skeptical examination of the Gov-
ernment's prime explanation for the gender line drawn by § 1409-the close connection of
mother to child, in contrast to the distant or fleeting father-child link." Id. at 1453-54. This
Comment, however, focuses more generally on the historic tension between immigration law
and gender-based equal protection jurisprudence, and the confusing case law that has emerged
as a result of this tension.
22. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 35-37 (defining heightened scrutiny).
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Part III analyzes Fiallo v. Bell,24 the last gender-based immigration
case the Supreme Court decided (notwithstanding Miller v. Aibright)
and Fiallo's subsequent impact on several lower court decisions in this
area. Part III concludes that immigration laws classifying persons
based on their gender should be subject to mid-tier scrutiny in ac-
cordance with all other gender-based laws. Moreover, Part III argues
that the level ofjudicial scrutiny applied in immigration cases should
not be determined by whether the law is technically labeled a
"citizenship" law or a mere "immigration" law, or by whether a
"citizen" or a mere "person" is party to the action.
Part IV analyzes section 309 of the INA under heightened scrutiny,
and suggests that the law violates the Equal Protection Clause be-
cause it unjustifiably classifies American parents based on their sex.
Part V recommends model legislation that recognizes that the blood
relationship between an illegitimate child and his or her natural fa-
ther may not be as easy to prove as the relationship between a simi-
larly situated child and his or her mother. Instead of punishing these
fathers and their children with an absolute ban on citizenship to
children not legitimized by the age of eighteen, Congress should
supplement section 309 with a discovery rule that would accommo-
date these physical differences.
I. THE TENSION BETWEEN CONGRESS' HISTORIC PLENARY POWER
OVER IMMIGRATION AND MODERN GENDER-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION
A. Federal Cases Regarding Equal Protection Challenges to Gender-Based
Immigration Laws
1. Overview
Although in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act Congress
professed the goal of "eliminat[ing] discrimination between the
sexes[J,]" at least two provisions of the INA continue to employ dis-
criminatory gender-based classifications.26 One such law, denying the
24. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
25. H.R. REP. No. 82-1365, at 1679 (stating that in addition to eliminating sex-based dis-
crimination, other goals of the 1952 INA include: Eliminating race as a qualification for immi-
gration, adding a system to give skilled aliens immigration preferences, and increasing back-
ground checks on prospective immigrants).
26. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1) (D) (1994)
(distinguishing between illegitimate foreign-born children based on the sex of their parents for
the purpose of obtaining special immigration visas); id. § 309 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409 (1994)) (distinguishing between illegitimate foreign-born children based on the sex of
their parents for the purpose of obtaining U.S. citizenship).
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illegitimate children of American fathers the same preferential im-
migration status afforded to the illegitimate children of American
mothers,27 became the subject of a major Supreme Court case, Fiallo
v. Bel428 in 1977.
For the first time, the Fiallo Court dealt with an equal protection
challenge to a law involving both an immigration policy (which the
Court typically reviews using a low level of scrutiny) and a sex-based
classification (which it typically reviews using a heightened level of
scrutiny). The Court chose to review the statute as an immigration
law, and accordingly held that the government simply had to show a
"facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for the sex-based classifica-
tion to survive the constitutional challenge.2 Some lower courts have
interpreted the "facially legitimate and bona fide" standard to be
equivalent to a traditional "rational basis''s° equal protection analysis
where the government must show that a law or policy has a legitimate
purpose and the classification rationally relates to that purpose.31
Still, other courts seem to have interpreted the standard as being
even less difficult to meet than rational basis.2
27. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1) (D) (1976)
(stating that the definition of a "child" under the INA includes "an illegitimate child, by,
through whom, or on whose behalf a status, privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the rela-
tionship of the child to its natural mother"). Because immigration privileges were awarded
based on other statutory provisions in the INA to children and parents falling within the defini-
tion of "child" stated above, illegitimate children of American fathers were always excluded
from receiving these privileges. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 802-03 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Section
1101 (b)(1)(D) was amended in 1986, nine years after the Fiallo decision. The amendment,
however, did not abolish the gender-based classifications. See Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986 § 315(a), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3439 (1986) (codified as amended 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (b)(1)(D) (1994)) (adding the clause"or to its natural father if the father has or had a
bona fide parent-child relationship with the person" after "natural mother").
28. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
29. See id. at 794-95. The "facially legitimate and bona fide standard" formally emerged in
Kleindienst v. Mandel 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972). In that case, a non-resident alien from Belgium
and several United States citizens challenged the constitutionality of a policy denying the alien
temporary admission to the United States to speak at various American universities about his
communist views. See id. at 764-69. The Court reaffirmed that aliens have no right to enter the
United States. See id. Recognizing that the denial of the alien's temporary visa infringed on the
First Amendment right to free speech of many United States citizens, the Court held that the
government must at least put forth a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for its policy
forbidding the alien's admission. See id. But see id. at 777 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I do not
understand the source of this unusual standard .... Merely 'legitimate' governmental inter-
ests cannot override constitutional rights.").
30. See Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (defining ra-
tional basis analysis under Equal Protection Clause).
31. SeeAblang v. Reno, 52 F.3d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that the facially legitimate
and bona fide reason test is the same as the rational basis test used in equal protection cases);
Azizi v. Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130, 1133 n.2 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that the facially legitimate
and bona fide test is merely "descriptive language" for a typical rational basis analysis).
32. See Fitao, 430 U.S. at 792 ("Our cases have long recognized the power to expel or ex-
clude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political de-
partments largely immune from judicial control.") (internal quotations and citations omitted);
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The Fiallo Court explicitly rejected applying a heightened or mid-
tier equal protection analysis" to the gender-based immigration stat-
ute, even though just one year earlier in Craig v. Boren the Court
held that mid-tier scrutiny applied to all gender-based classifications
challenged under the Fourteenth or Fifth Amendment. 5 Mid-tier
scrutiny requires the government to demonstrate that a challenged
statute serves an important objective, and that the gender-based clas-
sification is substantially related to meeting that objective.- Under
mid-tier scrutiny, in contrast to rational basis, there is a "strong pre-
sumption that gender classifications are invalid."" Consequently,
one is far less likely to succeed in challenging an immigration law
implicating a gender-based classification on equal protection
grounds than if one challenged the exact same gender-based classifi-
Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 1982) ("We do not know whether [a rational
basis] test must be met to validate [immigration] legislation ... because the Court teaches that
we only have a limited judicial review").
33. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 794-95.
34. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
35. See id. at 197-98. The Court in Craig based the mid-tier standard on several earlier
gender-based equal protection cases that had employed a heightened scrutiny analysis to evalu-
ate a gender-based classification. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643-45
(1975) (holding that a law giving Social Security benefits to widow and her children, but not
widower and his children, violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 688-91 (1973) (invalidating a law that automatically gave spouses of male soldiers
medical benefits, but only gave spouses of female soldiers such benefits upon proof of hus-
band's financial dependency); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1972) (holding unconstitu-
tional a law favoring fathers over mothers in the administration of a child's estate).
36. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197-98.
37. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) (quotingJ.E.B. v. Alabamaex teL
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring));see also Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct.
1428, 1445-46 (1998) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("It is unlikely.., that any gender classifica-
tions based on stereotypes can survive heightened scrutiny, but under rational scrutiny, a stat-
ute may be defended based on generalized classifications unsupported by empirical evi-
dence.") (citation omitted); cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (explaining
that under rational basis most classifications are presumptively non-discriminatory, and hence
constitutional).
In Miler v. Albright, Justice Stevens purported to apply mid-tier scrutiny to § 309, noting that
.citizenship laws" probably deserve more scrutiny than ordinary immigration laws. See 118 S.
Ct. at 1434-35 (stating thatFiallo dealt with a statute granting "special immigration preference"
to aliens, unlike Miller which deals with a law determining petitioner's citizenship, and, there-
fore, Fiallo did not necessarily dictate the outcome of the case). Despite the presumption that
statutes analyzed under mid-tier scrutiny are invalid, Justice Stevens held that the gender-based
classifications in § 309 were constitutional. See id. at 1437 n.1 1 ("Even if the heightened scru-
tiny that normally governs gender discrimination claims applied in this context" section 309
would be constitutional).
Five justices disagreed with Justice Stevens' mid-tier scrutiny analysis. See id. at 1445
(O'Connor,J., concurring) ("I do not shareJustice Stevens' assessment that the provision with-
stands heightened scrutiny. ... "); id. at 1454 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that stereotypes
about "the way women (or men) are ... pervade the opinion of Justice Stevens, which con-
stantly relates and relies on what 'typically,' or 'normally,' or 'probably' happens 'often'")
(citation omitted); id. at 1457-58 (BreyerJ., dissenting) (noting that"likeJustice O'Connor, I
do not share, and thus I believe a Court majority does not share, Justice Stevens' assessment
that the provision withstands heightened scrutiny") (internal quotations omitted).
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cation in a non-immigration context."
The Fiallo Court found that the unreliability of paternity testing
and "a perceived absence in most cases of close family ties"' 9 between
putative fathers and their illegitimate children, constituted "facially
legitimate" reasons for the more rigorous requirements imposed on
the foreign-born illegitimate children of American fathers in obtain-
ing preferential immigration visas." Over a decade later, two circuit
courts as well as two justices of the Supreme Court, adopted nearly
the same Fiallo rationale to justify the tougher statutory requirements
for citizenship imposed on foreign-born illegitimate children of
American fathers, as compared to the requirements imposed on for-
eign-born illegitimate children of American mothers.4' These circuit
court cases will be analyzed in more detail in Part II. The fundamen-
tal issues these cases raise, however, can best be explained through a
brief factual examination of Miller v. Albright,4 the first case dealing
with an equal protection challenge to a sex-based classification in an
immigration law to reach the Supreme Court since Fiallo.4
2. Miller v. Albright-background
Miller involved a Fifth Amendment Equal Protection challenge" to
section 309 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.45 Specifically, the
38. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
39. See F ia/o, 430 U.S. at 799.
40. See id.
41. See Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d
801,804 (9th Cir. 1995); infraPart .C (providing an analysis of Miller v. Christopher and Ablang);
see also Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1439 (noting that in addition to the important governmental interest
in ensuring reliable genetic proof of paternity, the government has an interest in ensuring a
"healthy relationship" between the citizen-parent and the child born out-of-wedlock before the
child reaches eighteen). Justice Stevens further stated:
When a child is born out of wedlock outside of the United States, the citizen mother,
unlike the citizen father, certainly knows of her child's existence and typically will
have custody of the child .... By contrast, due to the normal interval of nine months
between conception and birth, the unmarried father may not even know that his child
exists, and the child may not know the father's identity.
Id.
42. 118S. Ct. 1428 (1998).
43. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
44. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. 1428; see also infra Part I.C.2 (discussing the applicability of the
Fifth Amendment to aliens).
45. See8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)-(c) (1994). If a child is born out of wedlock abroad, the follow-
ing criteria must be met for the child to become a U.S. citizen:
(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is established by clear
and convincing evidence,
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of the person's
birth,
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial support
for the person until the person reaches the age of 18 years, and
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years-
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statute allows the foreign-born illegitimate children of American
mothers to receive automatic American citizenship, while requiring
the foreign-born illegitimate children of American fathers to meet
several additional criteria to qualify for American citizenship, includ-
ing: (1) clear and convincing evidence of a blood relationship be-
tween the father and child; (2) a father's written statement agreeing
to provide financial support to the child until he or she is eighteen;
and (3) a father's voluntary acknowledgment of his paternity under
oath, or a court adjudication confirming that fact before the child
reaches eighteen.6
The plaintiff in Miller, Lonera Penero ("Penero"), was the illegiti-
mate Philippine-born daughter of a former American soldier and a
Filipino mother. Penero's father, living in the United States, did
not recognize her as his daughter until several years after she
reached the age of eighteen. Penero subsequently applied for
United States citizenship, but the State Department denied her ap-
plication because her father failed to legitimize her prior to the age
mandated in the INA . Joined by her father, Penero first appealed
her denial of citizenship to the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas. In an unreported order, however, the dis-
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person's residence or domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under oath, or
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a competent court.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in section 405 of this Act, the provisions of section
1401 (g) of this title shall apply to a child born out of wedlock on or after January 13,
1941, and before December 24, 1952, as of the date of birth, if the paternity of such
child is established at any time while such child is under the age of twenty-one years by
legitimation.
(c) Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (a) of this section, a person
born ... outside the United States and out of wedlock shall be held to have acquired
at birth the nationality status of his mother, if the mother had the nationality of the
United States at the time of such person's birth, and if the mother had previously
been physically present in the United States... for a continuous period of one year.
Id.
46. See id. at (a) (1)-(4). The plaintiff in Millerwould have been able to satisfy the require-
ment of § 1409(a) (4) by showing that she was legitimated before reaching age 21, rather than
18, because she fell under a narrow statutory age bracket specified in § 1409(a) (4), before it
was amended prospectively in 1986. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1433 n.3 (citing the Immigration
and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653, § 13, 100 Stat. 3657).
47. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1432-33.
48. See id. at 1433 (noting Penero's father obtained a Voluntary Paternity Decree from a
Texas state court declaring him the "biological and legal father of Lorelyn Penero") (citation
and internal quotations omitted).
49. Id. at 1433 n.3. The plaintiff in Miller was 22 years old when she was recognized for-
mally as a daughter of an American father. See Miller v. Christopher, 870 F. Supp. 1, 1 n.1
(D.D.C. 1994).
50. See id. at 1433; Miller v. Christopher, C.A. No. 6: 93 CV 39 (E.D. Tex. June 2, 1993)
(unreported order), cited in Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(dismissing Penero's American father from the lawsuit for lack of standing).
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trict court dismissed Penero's father for lack of standing, and conse-
quently transferred the case to the District of Columbia because
venue in the Eastern District of Texas was no longer proper.5' The
District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the suit entirely
holding that Plaintiff (without her father as co-plaintiff) lacked stand-
ing because she failed to demonstrate that the court had the power
to redress her injury by granting her citizenship.5 Penero subse-
quently appealed to the D.C. Circuit, and then to the Supreme
Court.53 Her father, however, was not a co-plaintiff in these actions.
The D.C. Circuit, following the Fiallo precedent, held that section
309 was "entirely reasonable"" because "[a] mother is far less likely to
ignore the child she carried in her womb," whereas the putative fa-
ther "is very often totally unconcerned because of the absence of any
ties to the mother."' As Judge Patricia Wald pointed out, concurring
in the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Millerv. Christopher, the majority opin-
ion and the Fiallo decision upon which it was based, sanctioned
"stereotypes" and "overbroad generalizations" about men and
women. Therefore, Judge Wald concluded, as did five of the Su-
preme Court justices in Miller v. Albright,57 that under mid-tier scru-
tiny,68 section 309 violated the Equal Protection Clause.59 The gov-
51. SeeMiller, 118 S. Ct. at 1433 (explaining procedural history of the case).
52. See Miller v. Christopher, 870 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that Plaintiff did
not demonstrate the "redressability" element of the standing inquiry because "courts do not
have the power to confer citizenship in the absence of statutory authority") (citation omitted);
see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (holding that an essential ele-
ment of constitutional standing is that "it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,'
that the injury will 'be redressed by a favorable decision'") (citation omitted).
53. See Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub nom. Miller v.
Albright, 117 S. Ct. 1689 (1997).
54. See Miller, 96 F.3d at 1471-72.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 1477 (Wald,J., concurring).
57. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1449-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by justices Breyer and
Souter) (noting that section 1409 "rests on familiar generalizations: mothers, as a rule, are re-
sponsible for a child born out of wedlock; fathers unmarried to the child's mother, ordinarily,
are not."); id. at 1461 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Souter) (noting
that the statutory distinctions in § 1409 are based on "the generalization that mothers are sig-
nificanty more likely than fathers to care for their children, or to develop caring relationships
with their children"); id. at 1445-46 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Justice Kennedy)
(stating that under heightened scrutiny, gender classifications based on stereotypes are uncon-
stitutional). But see id. at 1441-42 (Stevens, J., joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist) (arguing that
the "gender equality principle" repudiating statutory classifications based on stereotypes "is
only indirectly involved" in § 1409; but, maintaining that it is the important physical difference
between men and women thatjustify the statute's classification).
58. See infra Part I.D.1 (discussing mid-tier scrutiny).
59. See Miller, 96 F.3d at 1477 (Wald, J., concurring) (noting that because Fiallo is a Su-
preme Court case that is "directly on point," she must find the statute constitutional anyway).
But see id. at 1472 (stating that "even if... section 1409(a) were based on an overbroad and
outdated stereotype concerning the relationship of unwed fathers and their illegitimate chil-
dren, this argument should be addressed to the Congress rather than the courts") (internal
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ernment argued, however, that regardless of whether the classifica-
tion sanctioned stereotypes, non-resident aliens have no inherent
right to citizenship by virtue of their birth to an American citizen
abroad, and thus no right to equal protection under the Fifth
Amendment.6° Therein lie the fundamental conflicts.
The remaining sections in Part I provide background on the his-
torical basis of Congress' plenary power over immigration, the consti-
tutional debate over whether immigrants seeking to become citizens
through their birthright are protected by the constitution, and the
impact of United States v. Virginia' on modern gender-based equal
protection law.
B. Congress' Unrestrained Power Over Immigration
Congress' power to regulate immigration is not explicitly enumer-
ated in the Constitution.62 Rather, the Supreme Court in the 1889
Chinese Exclusion Case'a regarded Congress' authority to both admit
and expel aliens at its discretion as "too clearly within the essential
attributes of sovereignty to be seriously contested."' Throughout the
twentieth century, the Court continued to reaffirm Congress' plenary
power over aliens seeking admission to, and those already residing
quotation and citation omitted).
60. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1436 n.10 (citing Respondent's Brief at 11-12,available in 1997
WL 433315) (noting that the Court does not need to address the question of an extraterritorial
alien's substantive rights under the Fifth Amendment until the Court resolves the predicate
question of whether plaintiffis a citizen); see also infra Part .C (discussing the application of the
Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to non-citizens).
61. 518 U.S. 515, 556-58 (1996) (holding that the male-only admission policy at the Vir-
ginia Military Institute violated the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause).
62. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad
and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 11, 12 (1985) ("As regards immigration, the courts
have admittedly built a constitutional jurisprudence wholly on extra constitutional founda-
tions.") (footnote omitted). But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress has the power"[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations"); U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (Congress has the
power "[t] o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization").
63. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
64. See id. at 607 (upholding a constitutional challenge to Congress' Act of 1888 that pro-
hibited Chinese laborers from re-entering the United States even though they had secured
permission to return before the Act had passed); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regula-
tion of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM.J. INT'L L. 862, 863-64 (1989) (stating the Court in the
Chinese Exclusion Case and subsequent cases thereafter deemed international law and the in-
herent power of all sovereigns to defend themselves against foreign invasion, as the primary
source of Congress' plenary power over immigration). Prior to the Chinese Exclusion Case,
the Court suggested in Edye v. Robertson ("Head Money Cases"), that Congress' plenary power
over immigration stems from article I, section 8 of the Constitution, which grants Congress the
power "[t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations." 112 U.S. 580, 592 (1884) (quotingU.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). Five years later, however, the Court implicitly replaced the rationale of
the Head Money Cases with the sovereignty theory expressed in the Chinese Exclusion Case
which still exists today. See Henkin, supra note 62, at 26-27.
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in, the United States. 5 In times of war or political crisis, including
the "Red Scare,"66 claims that Congress' immigration laws should be
subject to a more stringent review because they impugned the consti-
tutional rights of United States citizens were dismissed by the Court.67
In contrast, other areas of the law where Congress' power typically
has been considered plenary, are now subject to modem levels ofju-
dicial scrutiny when they implicate fundamental constitutional rights
of citizens or use suspect classifications under the Equal Protection
Clause.6 For example, in Rostker v. Goldberg, the Court questioned
whether the Selective Service Act, requiring only men to register for
draft, violated the Equal Protection Clause under the Fifth Amend-
ment.70 The Court, while acknowledging Congress' plenary power
over the military,7' determined that the courts should still apply a
heightened level of constitutional scrutiny to gender-based classifica-
tions in laws involving the military.7 The Court reasoned that apply-
65. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-35 (1982) (observing that the role of the judi-
ciary with respect to immigration is limited and does not extend to displace congressional pol-
icy choices); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) ("In the exercise of its broad power
over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unaccept-
able if applied to citizens."); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972) (stating that Con-
gress' power over immigration is very broad); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1954)
(noting that regardless of the "harsh incongruity" resulting from the deportation of an alien
who was "duped into joining the communist party," policies regarding the admission and de-
portation of aliens must remain exclusively with the political branches of government);
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (recognizing their power
over immigration has long been exercised by the political branches of government).
66. The Red Scare can be roughly defined as the years following World War II when the
house and senate committees investigated and persecuted hundreds of suspected communists
in the United States. See GRIFFIN FARIELLO, RED SCARE, MEMORIES OF THE AMERICAN INQUI-
SmON-AN ORAL HISTORY 28-44 (1995). According to Fariello, the fear of Soviets infiltrating
the United States affected all aspects of American life. See id. at 24-25. "State and federal inves-
tigators grilled suspected citizens on their reading habits, voting patterns, and church atten-
dance. Support for racial equality became evidence of subversive leanings.... Neighbors in-
formed on neighbors, students on their teachers." Id. at 25.
67. See Galvan, 347 U.S. at 532 (upholding a law that required a Mexican legal alien resid-
ing in the United States for thirty years, married to an American woman for twenty years and
raising four American children, to be deported permanently from the United States for an al-
leged lawful two year involvement with Communist Party in mid-1940s). The Galvan Court
noted that although a legal alien residing in the U.S. was a "person" under the Fifth Amend-
ment and thus entitled to due process rights, Congress' power over aliens is "very broad, touch-
ing as it does basic aspects of national sovereignty... foreign relations and the national secu-
rity." See id. at 530; Mande4 408 U.S. at 765-66 (stating a similar proposition regarding
Congress' power over aliens).
68. See Aleinikoff, supra note 64, at 865 ("Immigration law has remained blissfully un-
touched by the virtual revolution in constitutional law since World War II, impervious to devel-
opments in due process, equal protection and criminal procedure.").
69. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
70. See id. at 59-61.
71. See id. at 66 (noting that article I, section 8 of the Constitution explicitly delegates to
Congress authority for maintaining the armed forces).
72. See id. at 69-70, 83 (holding that under a heightened scrutiny analysis the Selective
Service Act's gender-based classification was constitutional).
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ing a uniform constitutional standard for all gender-based classifica-
tions prevented "levels of 'scrutiny'... [from becoming] facile ab-
stractions used to justify a result.' 7n
The reliance on the plenary power of Congress to protect the secu-
rity of this nation through seemingly discriminatory immigration laws
is no longer viable; at best, this reliance is a spill-over from decades
where there was a perceived threat "from vast hordes of [Chinese]
people crowding in upon us 74 or from the "treachery [and] deceit"
75
of communist revolutionaries." Yet, the Court continues to wave
precedent from an era long past to justify, inter alia, Congress' pref-
erences to admit heterosexuals rather than homosexuals,77 and le-
gitimate children rather than illegitimate children 78 into this country,
where it probably would not have such flexibility to make these dis-
tinctions in the domestic sphere.9
73. See id. at 69-70. But see Galvan, 347 U.S. at 531 (acknowledging that even though the
concept of substantive due process has expanded to limit all of Congress' determinations, in-
cluding those made under the war power, it does not apply to the entry and deportation of ali-
ens).
74. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581,605 (1889).
75. See Galvan, 347 U.S. at 529.
76. See Henkin, supra note 62, at 33-34 (explaining that discrimination based on race or
ethnicity has little relationship to national security); David Cole, Make Room for Daddy, N.J.L.J.,
Oct. 13, 1997, at 27 ("[N]othing in foreign affairs or the process of sovereign self-definition
calls for using sex as a proxy for family ties."). Recently, however, many concerns have been
raised in the United States regarding the potential economic threat that new waves of immi-
grants pose to society. See Michael J. Sheridan, The New Affidavit of Support and Other 1996
Amendments to Immigration and Welfare Provisions Designed to Prevent Aliens from Becoming Public
Charges, 31 CREIGHrTON L. REv. 741, 742 (1998) (discussing new legislation to address Congress'
growing concern with aliens who are likely to become public charges); William Branigin, In-
come, Support Requirements Imposed on Immigrant Sponsors, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1997, at A3
(describing new federal regulations that make it more difficult for low-income people to bring
foreign relatives into the United States because the INS wants to ensure that taxpayers will not
have to provide financial support to new immigrants). These economic concerns, however, do
not justify discrimination in immigration based on the race, gender, sexuality, legitimacy, or
ethnicity of an individual seeking to immigrate to the United States. See Cole, supra, at 27. In a
related context, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 and the Immigration Act of
1990 prohibit American employers from discriminating against authorized aliens based on na-
tional origin or citizenship status. See Fred W. Alvarez & Jill A. Marsal, Employment and Labor
Relations Law for the Corporate Counsel and the General Practitioner, SC63 A.L.I. 209, 219-22 (1998).
The Immigration Act of 1990 states that discrimination in hiring, recruiting, referring for a fee
or discharging any authorized individual is considered an unfair immigration-related employ-
ment practice. See8 U.S.CA § 1324b(a) (1) (A)-(B) (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).
77. SeeAdams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that a lawful gay mar-
riage in Colorado of an alien to an American citizen does not qualify the alien for an extended
visa as an "immediate relative" of his spouse).
78. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799-800 (1977); Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d
1467, 1472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1996), aFfd on other grounds sub nom. Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428
(1998); Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d 801, 806 (9th Cir. 1995).
79. In Miller v. Albright, several justices noted that Congress continues to maintain plenary
power over immigration. See 118 S. Ct. at 1437 n.11 (recognizing"(d]eference to the political
branches" in matters of immigration); id. at 1446 (O'ConnorJ., concurring) (noting immigra-
tion is an area of the law where Congress may make law based on generalizations); id. at 1447
(Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210
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For instance, the Court in Trimble v. Gordon,"' applying heightened
scrutiny to an Illinois law, held statutory discrimination against ille-
gitimate children to be unconstitutional.8' Ironically, on the same
day Trimble was decided, the Court held in Fiallo v. Bell that in the
context of immigration, discrimination against foreign-born illegiti-
mate children of American citizens was constitutional as long as the
government had a mere "facially legitimate" reason for the law.82 The
Court's ambivalence appears to create inconsistent judicial answers
to the question "what is discrimination?" that hinge on whether the
offended class is an American citizen, or merely a "person""3 under
the law.
C. The Constitutional Basis For Protecting Aliens
1. The right to citizenship
There are only two methods by which a person may become a
United States citizen.4 Based on the feudal notion ofjus soli, mean-
ing citizenship determined by one's place of birth rather than one's
descent, 5 the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a person born
on United States territory automatically becomes an American citi-
zen.6 A person born outside the United States can also become a
citizen through naturalization, a process that the Constitution explic-
(1953)) ("Judicial power over immigration and naturalization is extremely lim-
ited. .... 'Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.'").
Even Justice Breyer, who would have held section 309 unconstitutional, recognized that the
.more lenient standard [of review] in matters of 'immigration and naturalization'" would apply
in "a case involving aliens." Id& at 1459 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice
Breyer, however, believed that section 309 was not merely an immigration case involving aliens,
but a case involving the conferral of citizenship at birth and therefore deserving of more care-
ful scrutiny. See id. at 1458-60.
80. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
81. See id. at 765-66 (addressing an Illinois statute that prevented illegitimate children
from being heirs to their fathers' estates).
82. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 794-95. The Supreme Court in Miller did not hear arguments re-
garding the statutory distinctions between "illegitimate" and "legitimate" children that the
Fiallo Court previously addressed. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1434-35 (noting the Court only
granted certiorari to the sex-based equal protection issue).
83. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that the amendment applies to all"persons" and not
merely to United States "citizens"); infra Part I.C (discussing the constitutional implications of
the citizen-person distinction).
84. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702-04 (1898) (detailing the constitu-
tional provisions for acquiring United States citizenship).
85. SeeRogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 828 (1971) (describing the origins of America's phi-
losophy regarding citizenship). Unlike the United States, most civil law countries base citizen-
ship on the common law notion of jus sanguinis, literally meaning "the right of blood." In
these countries, regardless of where one is born, citizenship descends through one's bloodline.
SeBLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 862 (6th ed. 1990); Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1459.
86. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to thejurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States .... ").
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itly delegates to Congress to control through legislation.87 Therefore,
an American citizen has no inherent right to transmit citizenship to
his child born abroad absent statutory authorization from Congress."
2. The Fifth Amendment as applied to non-citizens
Although the Fifth Amendment does not explicitly contain an
Equal Protection Clause similar to that of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which applies only to states,80 the Court has incorporated equal
protection into the Fifth Amendment's concept of due process.9o
The Fifth Amendment, applicable to federal laws, provides that "[n]o
person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."9' The words "person" and "citizen," however, are not
defined, and the term "alien" is not even mentioned in the Constitu-
tion." Certainly, if the framers intended "persons" to include only
citizens, they could have specified this, because the term "citizen"
appears in several other sections of the Constitution.93
87. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (providing Congress power "[tbo establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization ... throughout the United States"); INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 883-85
(1988) (noting Congress has exclusive power to confer citizenship to persons born outside the
United States); cf Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Congressional Arrogation of Power: Alien Constellation in
the Galaxy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. REV. 591, 635-36 (1994) (explaining that the Constitu-
tion's reference to "uniform" in describing naturalization means geographic uniformity across
the states, and not equal treatment for every alien).
88. Cf Rogers, 401 U.S. at 826-27, 836 (rejecting a due process challenge to an immigration
law that allowed a child born abroad to one American parent to maintain United States citizen-
ship status by fulfilling certain residency requirements before turning 28 years-old). Plaintiff in
Rogers failed to fulfill the requirements of the statute, and thus, pursuant to federal law, his citi-
zenship expired. See id.
89. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall.., deny to any person within its ju-
risdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
90. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (applying equal protection require-
ments to the Federal Government through the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
91. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
92. See Rogers, 401 U.S. at 829 (suggesting the omission of a definition of citizenship in the
original Constitution may have been related to a "desire to avoid entanglement in the then-
existing controversy between concepts of... citizenship and ... the status of Negro slaves").
93. See Henkin, supra note 62, at 12-15 (noting that the Constitution originally only re-
ferred to "citizens" in three major areas: when describing the qualifications for service in Con-
gress, when describing the pre-requisites for becoming president, and when referring to the
"Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several states") (citation omitted). Henkin fur-
ther pointed out:
The Bill of Rights... also does not specify whose rights it was designed to safe-
guard .... Do these provisions protect only "the people" who ordained and estab-
lished the Constitution, and therefore perhaps only those who were eligible to vote to
ratify the Constitution? Are the "people" protected by the fourth amendment [sic]
different from the "persons" to whom the fifth amendment [sic] provides the protec-
tion... [from] deprivation of life, liberty, or property... ?
Id. at 14-15; see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265-66 (1990) (noting that
while there is no conclusive proof, it appears that "the people" referred to in the First, Second,
Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments may be different from the "person" protected in the
Fifth Amendment).
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Precedent supporting the notion that both legal and illegal alien
persons physically residing in the United States receive the protec-
tion of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments is well-established.9
The more difficult question, however, involves whether aliens outside
the United States seeking to become citizens are also entitled to the
protection of the Fifth Amendment. It does not appear that the
Court has ever fully addressed this question, as previous immigration
cases involved either citizens or aliens that have lived in the United
States.95 Moreover, the Court declined the opportunity to decide this
question in Miller v. Albright.96
94. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (holding a Texas law denying undocu-
mented aliens residing in the United States a free public education violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976)
(stating that even those who are in the United States unlawfully or temporarily are entitled to
constitutional protection under the Fifth Amendment);Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369
(1886) ("The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of
citizens .... [It applies] to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction. .. ").
95. SeeFiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 790 (1977) (both aliens and citizens joined suit to chal-
lenge constitutionality of immigration law); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)
(both citizens and alien challenged the constitutionality of visa denial); Galvan v. Press, 347
U.S. 522, 523 (1954) (challenging the constitutionality of deportation of a legal alien residing
in the United States for thirty-six years); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 581 (1952)
(challenging constitutionality of a legal alien's deportation).
The Court, however, has addressed the question of whether nonresidents are protected by
other parts of the Constitution. See Verdugo-Urquidz, 494 U.S. at 261 (holding the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to search and seizure of property by United States agents when the
property was owned by a nonresident alien living in a foreign country); Rogers, 401 U.S. at 816-
17 (challenging unsuccessfully the constitutionality of an immigration law that stripped a for-
eign-born child of an alien-father and citizen-mother of his American citizenship because he
did not fulfill certain residency requirements); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777
(1950) (denying Fifth Amendment habeas corpus protection to an enemy alien that: (1) had
never been to the United States; (2) had been captured and held as a prisoner of war outside
the United States; (3) was tried and convicted by a military commission located outside the
United States for offenses committed outside the United States; and (4) was imprisoned out-
side the United States).
In oral argument before the Supreme Court during Miller v. Allnight, the Court questioned
counsel for the petitioner as to whether an alien having no right to citizenship through her
descent, and having never otherwise been to the United States, could raise a claim under the
Fifth Amendment. One Justice suggested that Rogers was sufficient precedent to allow a non-
resident alien to challenge a law under the Fifth Amendment. There was clearly confusion,
however, as to whether the Court had ever decided this issue. See United States Sup. Ct. Official
Tr., Miller v. Albright, No. 96-1060, 1997 WL 699809, at *25-26 (Nov. 4, 1997);see also Miller v.
Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1445 (1998) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating "it is unclear
whether an alien may assert constitutional objections when he or she is outside the territory of
the United States").
96. For example,Justice Stevens stated briefly in a footnote that the pressing question was
whether or not the plaintiff was in fact a citizen or an alien, and not the more ambiguous ques-
tion of whether an alien outside the United States has substantive rights under the Fifth
Amendment. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1436 n.10 (citingJohnson, 339 U.S. 763; Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259). Similarly, Justice O'Connor stated that she would simply"assume," without de-
ciding, that the petitioner could raise a constitutional challenge. See id. at 1445 (O'ConnorJ.,
concurring). Finally, Justice Scalia noted that because he believed that the petitioner had
third-party standing to assert the constitutional rights of her father, the question of petitioner's
own rights as an alien not living in the United States did not need to be resolved. See id. at 1447
n.1 (Scalia,J., concurring).
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In lower federal court decisions, many courts have assumed
"limited judicial responsibility 97 to review the constitutionality of
immigration (or citizenship) laws containing gender-based classifica-
tions, regardless of whether citizens, or alien-children of citizens as-
sert the claim.98 It is this limited review of gender classifications in
immigration law, however, that appears to be "out of step with the
Court's current refusal to sanction 'official action that closes a door
or denies opportunity to women (or to men)."'"
D. Gender Equal Protection Analysis
1. The traditional mid-tier analysis
Mid-tier scrutiny applies to laws that categorize persons based on
their sex.'00 The mid-tier equal protection analysis, as its name sug-
gests, falls somewhere between a rational basis analysis,'' applied to
laws that classify persons based on factors such as social welfare'02 or
age,'03 and a strict scrutiny analysis, typically applied to laws that clas-
sify persons based on race'" or ethnicity.1°'
97. See, e.g., Elias v. United States Dep't of State, 721 F. Supp. 243, 248 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(quoting Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 793 n.5).
98. See Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1996),affld on other grounds sub
nom. 118 S.Ct. 1428 (1998); Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 1995); LeBrun v.
Thornburgh, 777 F. Supp. 1204, 1209-10 (D.N.J. 1991) (assuming that because the Supreme
Court allows illegal aliens residing in this country to challenge laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment, then persons who may be citizens, but their citizenship is denied, can also chal-
lenge such laws); Elias, 721 F. Supp. at 245 ("[W]e note that plausible grounds may exist to at
least support plaintiff's challenge on her own behalf").
99. See Miller, 96 F.3d at 1477 (Wald,J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515,532 (1996)).
100. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1978) ("[C]lassifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives.").
101. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (describing rational basis test).
102. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 600-01 (1987) (denying equal protection challenge
under rational basis to an amendment to the Aid to Families with Dependent Children pro-
gram that reduced some families' benefits, but not others, based on the number of members in
one's household).
103. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (upholding
Massachusetts law requiring policemen to retire at age 50 as rationally based on state's desire to
have young, physically fit persons protecting them).
104. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (holding Virginia statute that forbid
inter-racial marriages violated Fourteenth Amendment because it has no "overriding purpose"
except perhaps "White Supremacy"). Under strict scrutiny analysis, the government must show
the challenged classification serves a compelling government interest, and the classification is
the least restrictive way to accomplish the purpose of the legislation. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467
U.S. 216, 219 (1984).
105. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (holding restrictions on citi-
zens ofJapanese ancestry are subject "to the most rigid scrutiny"); Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (stating classifications based on ethnic origin are "odious to free peo-
pie whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality").
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The case law applying mid-tier scrutiny to gender-based statutes
and policies, however, has been notably inconsistent.' For the most
part, the Court has continued to uphold gender-based classifications
challenged under the Equal Protection Clause when it finds that ei-
ther: (1) women deserve preferential treatment to remedy past dis-
cimination;' 7 or (2) men and women are not similarly situated as a
result of physical differences9
2. The new implications for gender-based equal protection under United
States v. Virginia
Recently, the Supreme Court added yet another dimension to the
gender equal protection analysis. In United States v. Virginia,'9 the
Court held that the Virginia Military Institute ("VMI") did not have
an "exceedingly persuasive justification""" for excluding women, and
therefore the state institute's men-only admission policy violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' As Justice
Scalia pointed out in his dissent in United States v. Virginia,"2 and Pro-
fessor Kovacic-Fleischer expanded upon in a recent article,'1 3 the
Court "appears to raise gender equal protection analysis to the level
of strict scrutiny""' without explicitly declaring it as such."5 In es-
sence, the Court ordered VMI to "accommodate" 6 for the physical
106. See generallyj.E.B. v. Alabamaex tel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring) (recognizing that the mid-tier standard is unclear); see also Candace Saari Kovacic-
Fleischer, United States v. Virginia's New Gender Equal Protection Analysis with Ramifications For
Pregnancy, Parenting, and Title VII, 50 VAND. L. REv. 845,868-69 & n.130 (1997) (describing mid-
tier equal protection cases as a "confusing conglomeration" that has evoked criticism from le-
gal commentators and justices alike).
107. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 106, at 859, 868 and cases cited therein. For example,
in Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 318 (1977), the Court held that giving women certain Social
Security benefits not given to men was permissible to "compensate women for past economic
discrimination."
108. SeeKovacic-Fleischer, supra note 106, at 859, 868 and cases cited therein; Michael M. v.
Superior Court., 450 U.S. 464, 472-73 (1981) (upholding California law imposing criminal li-
ability for statutory rape only on men). The Court in Michael M. found that the State's impor-
tant governmental interest in enacting the law was to prevent teenage pregnancy. Therefore,
the Court held that because women were punished enough by the "inescapably identifiable
consequences of teenage pregnancy," the legislature was justified in making only men crimi-
nally liable for statutory rape. See id. at 473. But see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533
(1996) (recognizing physical differences between men and women, yet still invalidating the
Virginia Military Institute's male-only admission policy).
109. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
110. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 530 (stating that the party defending the sex-based classifica-
tion has the burden of demonstrating this "exceedingly persuasive justification").
111. See id. at 518.
112. See id. at 566 (Scalia,J., dissenting)
113. SeeKovacic-Fleischer, supra note 106, at 873-75 (noting the Court recognized that"VMI
can achieve its purpose in a manner less restrictive than excluding all women.").
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 550-51 & n.19 (stating that VMI must create a remedy for
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differences between "capable"' 17 women and men who want to attend
VMI-a remedy that implies that the state must find "a least-
restrictive-means"" 8 to accomplish its stated purpose. 9 For example,
the Court noted that VMI might need to build separate barracks to
accommodate for women's privacy needs and adjust certain compo-
nents of the physical training programs to accommodate for women's
different athletic ability.1 ° Traditionally, the remedy for equal pro-
tection violations in gender equal protection cases was to treat the
excluded class identical to the opposite sex, or to abolish the law en-
tirely.
121
Finding the "least-restrictive-means" for accommodating the physi-
cal differences between men and women is especially applicable to
immigration or citizenship laws, such as section 309 of the INA.'22
Under the "least-restrictive-means" approach, courts cannot avoid an
equal protection analysis by merely asserting that "mothers and fa-
thers of illegitimate children are not similarly situated" as the D.C.
Circuit stated in Miller v. Christopher,' 23 and Justice Stevens endorsed
in Miller v. Albright 2 4 This Comment recommends in Part IV, using
United States v. Virginia as a model, a remedy that accommodates for
.capable" women to enter the school even if that remedy involves altering some of the existing
school programs).
117. See id. at 550 (defining "capable" as being able to perform "all individual activities re-
quired of a VMI cadet").
118. See id. at 566 (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (arguing that prior to Virginia, this Court had never
required a "least-restrictive means analysis" under mid-tier scrutiny); Kovacic-Fleischer, supra
note 106, at 873-75.
119. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534-35 (noting that the State's alleged purpose for excluding
women from VMI was to provide diversity in public education through single-sex education,
and to teach leadership skills through an "adversative" method that was specifically designed
for male students). The Court rejected the former justification as"benign" because "Virginia
has not shown that VMI was established, or has been maintained, with a view to diversifying, by
its categorical exclusion of women, educational opportunities within the State." See id. at 535.
As to the latter justification, the Court essentially held that VMI had to adjust its adversative
training program to accommodate both sexes. See id. at 550-51.
120. See id. at 550-51 n.19 (suggesting means for accommodating women's differences).
121. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728,738 (1984) (describing the two ways an unconsti-
tutional statute could be remedied to achieve "equal treatment" between the sexes).
122. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 309, 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1994).
123. 96 F.3d 1467, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1996), aff/d on other grounds sub nom. Miller v. Albright,
118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998).
124. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1442 (noting"[t]he biological differences between single men
and single women provide a relevant basis for differing rules governing their ability to confer
citizenship on children born in foreign lands"). The Court in Virginia did acknowledge that
physical differences between the sexes could still be a basis for classifying men and women
based on their gender. These differences, however, could not be used "for the denigration of
the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual's opportunity." Virginia,
518 U.S. at 533 (citations omitted); see also Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 106, at 883 (arguing
that after United States v. Virginia the courts probably would not be able to justify differential
treatment under the law based on gender by simply asserting, without further analysis, that
men and women are physically "not similarly situated").
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the physical differences between men and women with respect to
child bearing without punishing the offspring of American fathers
born out of wedlock.
II. ANALYSIS OF GENDER-BASED IMMIGRATION LAW CASES
The Supreme Court in Miller v. Albright explicitly declined to
base its decision on its earlier gender-based immigration case, Fiallo
v. Bell.' The splintered Miller Court distinguished the case before it
from Fiallo by stating that the latter only involved the grant of special
immigration visas to illegitimate children of American parents, while
Miller involved the actual grant of American citizenship to this same
class of children.'"2  Accordingly, Justice Stevens, delivering the opin-
ion of the Court, stated Fiallo did not apply and instead he purported
to apply heightened or mid-tier scrutiny to section 309.28 Justice Ste-
vens, somewhat ambivalently, also pointed out that "[d]eference to
the political branches dictate[d] a 'narrow standard of review of deci-
sions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigra-
tion and naturalization."'"' 9
Notwithstanding the way that the Court attempted to distinguish
Miller from Fiallo, most of the issues and reasoning discussed in Fiallo
re-emerged in Miller.,' More importantly, by declining to address
Fiallo, the Miller Court left the long-standing conflict between immi-
gration law and gender-based equal protection law unresolved. This
Comment, therefore, analyzes the Fiallo decision and its progeny, and
suggests one approach to remedying the tension between the com-
peting areas of law.
A. The Citizen Versus Person Debate in Fiallo v. Bell
As briefly described above, in Fiallo v. Bell,'3' the Court rejected a
125. 118S. Ct. 1428 (1998).
126. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
127. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1434-35 (distinguishingMiller v. Altright from Fiallo v. Bel); id. at
1458 (Breyer,J., dissenting) (same).
128. See id. at 1437 n.11 ("[Wie are persuaded that the requirement imposed by
§ 1409(a) (4) on children of unmarried male, but not female, citizens is substantially related to
important governmental objectives.").
129. See id. at 1437 n.1l (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82 (1976)). But see supra
note 37 (explaining that a majority of the Miller Court acknowledged that Justice Stevens did
not apply the heightened scrutiny analysis to the statute properly).
130. For example, both courts had to decide: (1) whether heightened scrutiny should ap-
ply to gender-based classifications in a particular section of the INA, see Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1437
& n.1 1; (2) whether problems with paternity testingjustified Congress' differential treatment of
the mothers and fathers of illegitimate children, seeid. at 1437-39; and (3) whether the statutory
distinctions between mothers and fathers were based on archaic stereotypes, see id. at 1441-42;
infra Part IIA (discussing Fiallo case).
131. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
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constitutional equal protection challenge brought jointly by non-
resident aliens and American citizens to section 101 (b) of the INA,' 2
which granted automatic preferential immigration status, not citizen-
ship, 33 to the illegitimate foreign-born children of American moth-
ers, but not to the illegitimate foreign-born children of American fa-
thers.'TM Since this decision, many lower courts seem frustrated with
the Fiallo Court's analysis,' 5 and as a result, some courts appear to be
looking to Justice Marshall's dissent in Fiallo for clues to escape the
majority's holding.' The following three Sections analyze Fiallo, its
dissent and its impact on the subsequent lower court decisions pre-
ceding the Court's splintered decision in Miller v. Aliight.
1. The majority opinion
Notably, the majority opinion in Fiallo declined to ground its
analysis on the difference between laws that classify citizens based on
gender and those that classify non-resident aliens based on gender 37
132. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(D) (1994).
133. Cf. Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1436 (distinguishing between cases based on the denial of a visa
application and those based on the government's refusal to acknowledge an individual's citi-
zenship); Y.T. v. Bell, 478 F. Supp. 828, 832 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (distinguishing between laws that
only govern immigration status as opposed to those that actually grant citizenship).
134. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (1) (D) (1976) (granting preferential immigration status to chil-
dren). Section 101 (b) defines children, for purposes of the INA-
(1) The term 'child' means an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age who
is-
(A) a legitimate child; ... or
(C) a child legitimated under the law of the child's residence or domicile, or under
the law of the father's residence or domicile, whether in or outside the United States,
if such legitimation takes place before the child reaches the age of eighteen years and
the child is in the legal custody of the legitimating parent or parents at the time of
such legitimation;
(D) an illegitimate child, by, through whom, or on whose behalf a status, privilege, or
benefit is sought by virtue of the relationship of the child to its natural mother.
Id.
135. See, e.g., Wauchope v. United States Dep't of State, 985 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1993); Le-
Brun v. Thornburgh, 777 F. Supp. 1204, 1209 (D.N.J. 1991); Elias v. United States Dep't of
State, 721 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Cal. 1989). For a discussion of these cases, seeinfra Parts II.B.1-2.
136. See LeBrun, 777 F. Supp. at 1211 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (explaining that even though
the standard of review in immigration cases is purportedly limited, "courts must ensure that
rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment have not been violated" (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787, 809-10 (1977))) (citations omitted);Elias, 721 F. Supp. at 248 (stating similarly tojus-
tice Marshall that the legal issue in the case should be framed in terms of the rights of the
American citizen-mother, and not the alien child seeking citizenship); infra Part II.B.1
(discussing Elias decision).
137. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 794, 795 n.6 (rejecting the argument that because the statute ad-
versely affected the substantive rights of citizens, as opposed to non-resident aliens, a height-
ened level ofjudicial scrutiny should be applied). The Court swept this argument aside with
what it considered to be overriding concerns regarding the "exercise of the Nation's sovereign
power to admit or exclude foreigners." See id. Justice Marshall, in his dissent, however, framed
the constitutional issue in this case around the rights of the citizens involved, not the aliens. See
infra Part IIA2.
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Rather, the Court framed its equal protection analysis simply in the
context of "immigration legislation, ' 3 and therefore reviewed the
law under the "facially legitimate and bona fide reason"'39 standard
typically applied to all constitutional challenges to immigration
laws.'
40
As a result, the Court's analysis centered more on justifying its very
limited authority to review Congress' decisions with regard to immi-
gration than it did on examining the discriminatory sex-based classi-
fication.'43 For example, the Court explained that Congress deserved
wide latitude in creating immigration laws because of the compli-
cated political and economic policies involved in the "line drawing"
between immigrants afforded special preferences and those who
were not.42  Yet, every prior instance the Court cited referring to
Congress' political line drawing between categories of aliens was
based on traditionally neutral factors such as age or marital status,
and not on suspect classifications such as the race, ethnicity,'4 or
gender of the prospective immigrant or his or her sponsoring citizen-
relative.4
138. See Fiao, 430 U.S. at 792 ("[It is important to underscore the limited scope ofjudicial
inquiry into immigration legislation.").
139. See id. at 794-95 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972));see also su-
pra note 29 (explaining the origin of the facially legitimate and bona fide standard).
140. See Fallo, 430 U.S. at 794 ("[T] his Court has resolved similar challenges to immigration
legislation based on other constitutional rights of citizens, and has rejected the suggestion that
more searchingjudicial scrutiny is required.").
As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alright distinguished section 309 from
section 101 (the statute in Fia/o) on the grounds that the former was a citizenship law and the
latter was an immigration law. Thus, Justice Stevens, as well as Justice Breyer in his dissenting
opinion, were able to avoid the "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" test applied in Fiabo
and apply heightened scrutiny instead. See Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1436 (1998)
(citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193-197 (1976)); id. at 1459-60 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
141. See Fialo, 430 U.S. at 791 ("Congress' power to fashion rules for the admission of aliens
[i]s 'exceptionally broad'"); id. at 792 ("[I]t is important to underscore the limited scope of
judicial inquiry into immigration legislation... [it is] largely immune from judicial control")
(citations and internal quotations omitted); id. at 793-94 (stating there was no precedent to
suggest that "Congress has anything but exceptionally broad power to determine which classes
of aliens may lawfully enter this country"); id. at 795 n.6 ("[D] espite the impact of these classifi-
cations on the interest of those already within our borders, congressional determina-
tions.., are subject to only limited judicial review."). Marshall criticized the majority's pur-
ported "review" as nothing more than "abdication." See id. at 805 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
142. See id. at 798-99 (identifying various "lines" that Congress must draw between groups of
people when it formulates immigration policy).
143. Congress abolished immigration quotas based on national origin in 1965 and replaced
them with immigration preferences for family members and skilled workers. See Act of Oct. 3,
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994)). Na-
tionality in some immigration procedures, however, is still a basis for classifying persons. See
Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future Congress Attacks the Right toJudicial Review of Immigration Pro-
ceedings, 29 CoNN. L. REV. 1411, 1491 (1997) (noting that nationals of certain countries, such as
Canada, are exempt from visa requirements, and that national origin often dictates differential
treatment in political asylum decisions).
144. See Fta!o, 430 U.S. at 798. The Court explained that Congress also classifies the for-
1376 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1353
2. Justice Marshall's dissent
Justice Marshall's dissent in Fiallo,45 on the other hand, empha-
sized that "this case, unlike most immigration cases that come before
the Court, directly involves the rights of citizens, not aliens.' 46  In
other words, Justice Marshall argued that because the statute was in-
tended to keep the families of American citizens together, 7 and be-
cause citizens applied for the immigration privilege on behalf of
their children,'48 the law must be subject to heightened scrutiny on
the grounds that it infringed on the fundamental due process rights
of citizens to live with their families.4 4 Additionally, Justice Marshall
argued that the classification was based on the citizen's gender, not
the alien's gender.' ° Accordingly, the statute could also be analyzed
as a violation of equal protection on the basis of an American citi-
zen's gender, and therefore must be subject to mid-tier scrutiny.
151
Justice Marshall thereafter suggested that the government's justifica-
tion for the statute-the perceived absence in closeness between fa-
thers and illegitimate children-was "based on habit, rather than
analysis" and could not withstand mid-tier scrutiny.
52
Justice Marshall employed a logical approach. He found a way to
apply heightened scrutiny to immigration laws by removing them
eign-born children of Americans seeking to immigrate on the basis of their age, their marital
status and their blood relationship with their citizen-parent. For example, step-children and
adopted children of American citizens must meet immigration criteria different from natural
children of an American citizen. See id.
145. See430 U.S. at 800.
146. Id. at 806
147. See id. at 806, reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2020 (indicating Congress' objective to
keep American families together (citing H.R. REP. No. 85-1199, at 7 (1957)).
148. See id. at 806.
149. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 810; cf. Linda Kelly, Preserving the Fundamental Right to Family Unity:
Championing Notions of Social Contract and Community Ties in the Battle of Plenary Power Versus Ali-
ens' Rights, 41 ViLL. L. REv. 725, 771-83 (1996) (suggesting "a constitutionally humane ap-
proach" to resolving the tension between the competing interests of immigration law and fam-
ily unity).
150. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 809 (noting that a "class of citizens" is being denied the "special
privilege of reunification" with their families in this country because of their gender). Unfor-
tunately, Justice O'Connor, concurring in Miller, did not follow Justice Marshall's reasoning
because-even though the statute in Miller also classified citizens-unlike Fiallo, in Miller there
were no American citizens challenging the statute. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying
text (explaining that the Plaintiff's citizen-father was not a party to the appeal in Miller).
151. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 809 (citing Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (19 7 7 ));see also
Califano, 430 U.S. at 210-11 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (noting that mid-tier scrutiny requires the sex-based classifica-
tion to serve important governmental interests and to be substantially related to that objective).
152. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 812 n.10 (citations omitted) (noting that perpetuation of stereo-
types cannot be an important governmental interest under heightened scrutiny). Justice Mar-
shall also analyzed the statute as a discriminatory classification based on the legitimacy of chil-
dren. See id. at 813. In Fiallo some of the petitioners were illegitimate citizen-children seeking
preferential immigration status on behalf of their alien-fathers. Therefore, Marshall could still
focus on the illegitimacy issue without acknowledging the rights of aliens. See id. at 789, 809.
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from the context of immigration per se and categorizing them as
constitutional violations against citizens rather than "persons" or ali-
ens. 3 In Fiallo, because both citizens and aliens were joined as plain-
tiffs,'5 this analysis was viable. Simply by focusing on the harm to the
citizen-father, however, Justice Marshall circumvented the more vex-
ing problem that was later left unresolved in Miller v. Aibright-
whether aliens challenging a law alone are entitled to raise constitu-
tional challenges when their rights are intimately bound with those
of a citizen.'55
Therefore, as evidenced in a small line of lower court cases that has
emerged since Fiallo, it appears that even Justice Marshall's analysis of
the gender-based immigration law becomes problematic. To some
extent, the outcomes of these cases appear to depend on the proce-
dural issue of whether a citizen and an alien are party to the suit, or
whether only the alien challenges the law.'5 Moreover, Justice Mar-
shall's reasoning has not reconciled the situation whereby the Court
has on the one hand espoused a very limited tolerance for sex-based
discrimination within its borders, but has on the other hand con-
doned such treatment when it has occurred outside the physical
boundaries of the country.157
153. See id. at 806-07 (suggesting that whether aliens have constitutional rights is irrelevant
when an immigration law denies privileges to some American citizens and not to others).
154. See id. at 790 (describing appellants as three sets of unwed putative fathers and their
illegitimate offspring; in each set, one person was an American citizen).
155. See id. at 807 ("It is irrelevant that aliens have no constitutional right to immi-
grate... [w]hen Congress draws such lines among ciliens the Constitution requires that deci-
sion comport with Fifth Amendment principles of equal protection and due process.")
(emphasis added); supra note 60 (discussing Miller Court's refusal to address an alien's rights
under the Constitution).
156. See infra Part II.B (describing third-party standing as a means to avoid the question of
an unadmitted alien's constitutional rights); see generally Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional
Jus Tertii, 88 HARv. L. REv. 423, 443 (1974) [hereinafter Standing to Assert ConstitutionalJus Ter-
tiz] (describing how the Court's reluctance to grant constitutionaljus tertii increases the risk of
confusing substantive constitutional claims with procedural questions).
157. See generally Henkin, supra note 62, at 32 (arguing that although the Constitution does
not give rights to persons abroad, it at least "requires[s] the United States government to re-
spect those human rights, with which all men and women are endowed equally"). Interestingly,
even the justices in Miller v. Albright that agreed that heightened scrutiny should apply to citi-
zenship laws containing sex-based classification, apparently did not believe that heightened
scrutiny should apply to similar immigration laws. See 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1437 n.11 (1998); id. at
1459-60 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
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B. Third-Party Standing as a Technique to Avoid Citizen Versus Person
Debate
1. Elias v. United States Department of State
In 1989, in Elias v. United States Department of State,t58 a California
district court held unconstitutional an immigration statute that
granted automatic citizenship to the foreign-born legitimate children
of American fathers but did not allow American mothers to transmit
this same right of citizenship 9 to their foreign-born legitimate chil-
dren.' The Federal Government defended the statute on two
grounds: (1) citizens do not have a constitutional right to transmit
their citizenship to foreign born off-spring;'6' and (2) based on the
very limited standard of judicial review in Fiallo, the court could not
"reevaluate" an immigration law.Y Rejecting the government's ar-
guments as not "persuasive,"' the Elias court held the immigration
law unconstitutional-a rare occurrence given the low level of scru-
tiny supposedly applied.'6 More important, however, is the manner
in which the court framed the constitutional issue.
Similar to Justice Marshall's dissent in Fiallo,'6s the Elias court
framed the equal protection issue in terms of the rights of the plain-
tiff's deceased citizen-mother rather than the plaintiff herself, a non-
resident alien seeking citizenship. Thus, this court also avoided rul-
ing on the more problematic issue of whether aliens challenging an
immigration law alone are entitled to constitutional protection when
their rights are directly defined by the sex of their citizen-parent.'
l
158. 721 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
159. See supra Part I.C. 1 (noting the transmission of one's American citizenship to a foreign-
born child is technically not a "right" unless Congress provides otherwise through legislation).
160. See Elias, 721 F. Supp. at 250; see also Section 1993 of the Revised Statute of 1874. This
statute was amended prospectively in 1934 to allow either mothers or fathers of legitimate chil-
dren to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children as long as the parent met certain
residency requirements. See Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, ch. 1, 66 Stat. 235
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1994)). The petitioner inElias was born prior to 1934,
therefore, the revised law did not apply to her. SeeElias, 721 F. Supp. at 244.
161. SeeElias, 721 F. Supp. at 247.
162. See id. at 248 (recognizing the government's argument that courts' limited review of
immigration legislation prohibited a reevaluation of the statute).
163. See id. at 249 (reasoning the government had offered no rationale to explain its differ-
ent treatment of men and women).
164. See generallyJohnny C. Parker, Equal Protection Minus Strict Scrutiny Plus Benign Classfica-
lion Equals What? Equality of Opportunity, 11 PACE L. REV. 213, 223 (1991) (comparing the out-
comes of laws tested under a rational basis analysis with those under mid-tier and strict scru-
tiny).
165. SeeFiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 806-07 (1977).
166. See Elias, 721 F. Supp. at 245-46 ("[W]e note that plausible grounds may exist to at least
support plaintiff's challenge on her own behalf.., however, we now turn to assertions
that.., no other reviewing courts have assessed: that the statute discriminates against United
States citizen females rather than the unadmitted alien."). As described above, the majority of
1378
1998] SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 1379
Procedurally, the court was able to join the plaintiffs deceased citi-
zen-mother in the suit through a doctrine commonly known asjus ter-
tii, or third-party standing. 67 Jus tertii standing is "not governed by a
constitutional requirement but by self-imposed rules of discretion,"'1
6
whereby a claimant can assert the concomitant constitutional rights
of third persons if there is some reason why the third party cannot
assert his or her own rights.'9 For example, in Craig v. Boren,'7 a beer
vendor challenged a 3.2 percent beer law setting the legal drinking
age for women at eighteen, but for men at twenty-one.'7  The Court
allowed the beer vendor to assert constitutional rights on behalf of all
men between the ages of eighteen and twenty because the original
plaintiff had since reached twenty-one, and therefore he could no
longer claim injury under the law.'2
The Elias court similarly allowed the plaintiff to assert the constitu-
tional rights of her citizen-mother, as it would be impossible for her
deceased mother to assert her own rights.173  Thereafter, the court
factually distinguished its case from Fiallo, noting that the Supreme
Court dealt with immigration visas in that case, not citizenship laws. 74
Moreover, although the Elias court professed to apply the Fiallo le-
gitimate bona-fide test,'75 it also cited rationale from a mid-tier scru-
tiny equal protection case, Craig v. Boren,'76 and a strict scrutiny sub-
stantive due process case, Moore v. City of East Cleveland,77 to bolster its
the Supreme Court in Fiallo had assessed the approach the Elias court used and rejected it,
while Justice Marshall, dissenting in Fallo, adopted it. See supra note 137 and accompanying
text (noting Fiallo court refused to analyze immigration statute from the perspective of the citi-
zens affected); supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text (describing Justice Marshall's ap-
proach to the statute which focused on the rights of citizens implicated by the immigration law,
rather than the rights of aliens).
167. See Elias, 721 F. Supp. at 246-47 (acknowledging standing according tojus tertit).
168. SeeCraigv. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193 (1976) (noting the"salutary rule of self restraint"
governing jus tertit); Elias, 721 F. Supp. at 246 (stating that the "barrier" preventing a person
from asserting the rights of a third party is not mandated by the Constitution).
169. Three criteria must be met for the court to grant third- party standing: (1) litigant had
suffered an "injury in fact"; (2) the litigant had a "close" relation to the third party; and
(3) some hindrance precluded the third party from asserting his or her own rights. See Camp-
bell v. Louisiana, 118 S. Ct. 1419, 1422-23 (1998) (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411
(1991) and Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976)).
170. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
171. Seeid.at192.
172. See id. at 192-95.
173. See Elias, 721 F. Supp. at 247.
174. See id. at 249; see also Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1436 (1998) (recognizing that
citizenship laws and immigrations should be analyzed differently).
175. See Elias, 721 F. Supp. at 249-50 (noting that even under the limited review mandated
by the Fiallo Court, the statute is unconstitutional).
176. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
177. 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (fourjustice plurality) ("[Flreedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause.") (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)).
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reasoning.'78 Justice Marshall in his dissent in Fiallo cited these cases
as well.'7
2. Wauchope v. United States Department of State
In Wauchope v. United States Department of State,'80 the Ninth Circuit
decided a nearly identical equal protection challenge to the one that
the Elias court heard four years earlier, and also granted third-party
standing to an alien-child on behalf of her deceased American citi-
zen-mother. 8 ' The Ninth Circuit seemed to struggle with the Fiallo
precedent requiring it to apply a mere rational basis test to a sex-
based category under the Equal Protection Clause when both the
rights of a citizen-parent and an alien-child were involved.'8 2 The
court recognized that the child was not merely seeking to immigrate,
as in Fiallo, but rather to become a citizen through her birthright:
"[W]e should perhaps utilize a more traditional (and hence more
rigorous) standard of scrutiny. ' 83 Ultimately, the court conceded
that because the Supreme Court mandated a deferential standard for
all immigration laws, it was bound to use a "facially legitimate and
bona fide reason test.'
'184
It appears, however, that the Ninth Circuit did not truly apply the
test that it enunciated. First, the Wauchope court explained the fac-
tual reasons why it believed that the case warranted heightened scru-
tiny. 85 Secondly, and most importantly, the court, citing Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 86 a gender-based equal protection Supreme Court case
178. See Elias, 721 F. Supp. at 250 (citing Craig and Moore); see also Moore, 431 U.S. at 499
(noting that when certain liberties protected by the Due Process Clause are intruded on by
regulation, ordinaryjudicial scrutiny of such a regulation is insufficient).
179. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 809-10 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing, among
other cases, Craigand Moore).
180. 985 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1993).
181. See id. at 1412-14; see also supra note 169 and accompanying text (explaining the crite-
ria for granting third-party standing).
182. See Wauchop; 985 F.2d at 1410-11 (noting that it is not readily apparent that the"very
deferential standard" of scrutiny applied in Fallo should apply to the gender-based classifica-
tions in this case) (quoting Reply Brief for the United States at 5-6).
183. See id. at 1414 (noting that the court would prefer to use a higher level of scrutiny, but
is ultimately bound by the Supreme Court to use the "facially legitimate and bona fide reason
test"). As mentioned previously, several justices of the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alhright, de-
cided that citizenship statutes should be reviewed with more scrutiny than immigration statutes
when a gender-based equal protection claim is raised. Seesupra note 37.
184. See Wauchope, 985 F.2d at 1414 (recognizing Congress' plenary powers in immigration
legislation) (citations omitted).
185. See id. at 1413-14 ("Unlike the governmental decisions at issue in Fiallo and Mande
Section 1993 represents not a Congressional determination that various aliens should or
should not be treated in a certain manner, but rather a decision as to who is a citizen in the
first instance.").
186. 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (holding unconstitutional a Social Security provision that pro-
vided benefits only to widows who chose to remain at home as full-time caretakers of their chil-
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that employed heightened scrutiny, decided that it did not need to
accept the government's assumptions regarding the legislative pur-
pose behind the statute. 7 Thereafter, the court investigated the
government's facially legitimate purpose for discriminating against
children of citizen-mothers-preventing dual citizenship-and con-
cluded that it was no longer a rational interest.'" The Wauchope
court's analysis seems quite different from the "facially legitimate"
standard the Supreme Court described in earlier immigration
cases.'" For example, when reviewing immigration laws, the Court
stated in Kleindienst v. Mandel, the "plenary congressional power to
make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been firmly
established .... [T]he courts will [not] look behind the exercise of
that discretion."' 9 The Wauchope court, at least to some extent, did
"look behind" Congress' exercise of power.
C. When Citizens Are Not Joined In the Action, Courts Appear to Scrutinize
the Legislation Less
Given the Ninth Circuit's emphasis on granting third-party stand-
ing on behalf of an American citizen in Wauchope,'92 and Justice Mar-
shall's dissent in Fiallo focusing on the rights of the citizen rather
than the unadmitted alien,' 93 one wonders what happens if an alien
alone challenges an immigration statute. Do these decisions mean
that the immigration legislation would really be "wholly outside the
dren, but not to similarly situated widowers who chose to be full-time caretakers of their chil-
dren).
187. See Wauchope, 985 F.2d at 1415 (quoting Wsenfeld, 420 U.S. at 648 n.16) (stating that
the court, in absence of the statute's legislative history, "need not... accept at face value asser-
tions of legislative purposes, when ... the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of the
legislation").
188. See id. at 1415-16. The court decided that although Congress had "appropriate con-
cern" in preventing dual nationality, see id. at 1415 (quoting Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 831
(1971)). The problem was not resolved by section 1993 which prevented legitimate foreign-
born children of United States citizen-mothers and alien-fathers from becoming citizens, see
Wauchop, 985 F.2d at 1415-16. The court supported its conclusions with careful research, seeid.
(citing Lester Orfield, The Citizenship Act of 1934, 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 99, 104 (1934); Richard
Flournoy, Jr., Dual Nationality and Election, 30 YALE L.J. 545, 548 (1921); A COLLECTION OF
NATIONALITY LAWS OFVARIOUS COUNTRES (Richard W. FlournoyJr. & Manley 0. Hudson eds.,
1929)).
189. See supra notes 6-8 (citing cases that describe the low-level of scrutiny afforded to im-
migration laws).
190. 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (involving constitutional challenge to immigration law that pre-
vented Marxist journalist from receiving temporary visa to speak at various American universi-
ties).
191. Mande4 408 U.S. at 769-70; cf United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)
(citations omitted) (noting that under mid-tier scrutiny the Court must determine whether the
justification is "genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc").
192. See Wauchope, 985 F.2d at 1410-11 (justifying grant of third-party standing to alien-
daughter on behalf of her deceased American mother).
193. See supra Part IIA2.
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power of [the] Court to control?'
94
For example, in Ablang v. Reno, 95 a 1995 challenge to an immigra-
tion statute evincing sex-based discrimination, the Ninth Circuit dis-
tinguished Wauchope on two grounds: (1) in Ablang no citizen was
party to the action even though the citizen-father was alive;' 96 and
(2) unlike dual nationality in Wauchope, the unreliability of paternity
testing of illegitimate children was a facially legitimate reason for
gender classifications.197 The court did recognize that technological
advances might have largely remedied Congress' concern with pater-
nity testing,98 and that other reasons for the statutory distinction
might have been based on "overbroad and outdated stereotype[s]
concerning the relationship of unwed fathers and their illegitimate
children .... "' Instead of evaluating these arguments, however,
the court, using the same language found in the Miller v. Christopher
opinion one year later, simply noted that such arguments "should be
addressed to the Congress rather than the courts,' 2° and held the
statute was constitutional.'
The fact that a citizen was not joined in either Ablang or Miller v.
Christopher did not change the court's stated "legitimate bona fide"
scrutiny test. The absence of a citizen in these suits, however, did
seem to affect the application of the test. In Wauchope, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that it was irrational to deny citizenship to the legiti-
mate children of one sex, but not to the other sex, based on the his-
tory of the dual citizenship theory.2  In contrast, in Ablang and Miller
194. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Frankfurter explained Congress' unrestrained power in this area over aliens, and remarked
that even if immigration laws were "cruel, whether they may have reflected xenophobia in gen-
eral or anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism," the Court had no authority to intervene. See id.
195. 52 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 1995).
196. See id. at 805 n.4.
197. See id. at 805; see also id. at 806 (noting that Congress' desire to promote early ties to
this country was also a rational reason to distinguish between illegitimate children of American
mothers and American fathers).
198. See id. at 805-06 (acknowledging "increasing use and reliability of blood and genetic
testing to establish paternity").
199. See id. at 805 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,799 n.9 (1977)).
200. SeeMiller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1996),aff'd on other grounds sub
norn. Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998) (quoting Fallo, 430 U.S. at 799 n.9).
The Ninth Circuit in Ablang also quoted Weinberger v. Wiesenfed, 420 U.S 636, 648 n.16
(1975), noting that courts "need not in equal protection cases accept at face value assertions of
legislative purposes, when ... the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of the legisla-
tion." Ablang, 52 F.3d at 805. However, the Ablang court seemed to "accept at face value" the
government's rationale, unlike the Wauchope courtjust two years earlier.
201. See Ablang, 52 F.3d at 806.
202. See Wauchope v. United States Dep't of State, 985 F.2d 1407, 1414-16 (9th Cir. 1993)
(citing Lester Orfield, The Citizenship Act of 1934,2 U. CtI. L. REv. 99, 104 (1934)) (finding that
Congress could not avoid dual nationality by only granting citizenship to the legitimate foreign-
born children of American fathers because most countries now have some form of gender neu-
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v. Christopher, where no citizens were joined, both courts refused to
research the government's rationale. 23 The courts declined to even
evaluate the advancements made in paternity testing technology dur-
ing the intervening years between the Fiallo decision in 1977, and the
Ablang and Miller v. Christopher decisions in 1995 and 1996, respec-
tively.
20'
D. When the Rights of Citizens and Aliens Are Inextricably Bound, the
Citizen Versus Alien Distinction Should Not Excuse Discrimination
1. Arguments for uniformly applying mid-tier scrutiny
In Wauchope, the court found that the interests of an American
parent and his or her foreign-born child "coincide [d]," and were
"equally as intense."'05 Yet, when the citizen was not technically
joined through a "self-imposed ''2 06 procedural doctrine such as third-
party standing, the substantive constitutional analysis in the lower
court decisions appears to be different.
2 7
If the citizen-father in Miller v. Albright, or even Ablang v. Reno, had
been deceased, and the Court accordingly had granted the plaintiffs
in these cases third-party standing, perhaps the challenged laws in
these cases would have been struck down. The courts seemingly have
allowed a procedural technicality to overshadow the substantive con-
tral policy ofjus soli, whereby there could be just as many children of American fathers with
dual nationality as children of American mothers). But see Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 832
(1971) (finding dual nationality is an appropriate concern of Congress because it fosters di-
vided loyalty in a child). The Beii Court noted that "[t]hese problems are particularly acute
when it is the father who is the child's alien parent" and his family lives abroad. See id.
203. See Miller, 96 F.3d at 1472 ("[E]ven if... the requirements of section 1409(a) were
'based on an overbroad and outdated stereotype concerning the relationship of unwed fathers
and their illegitimate children,' the Supreme Court specifically noted that 'this argument
should be addressed to the Congress rather than the courts.'"); Ablang, 52 F.3d at 805.
Appellants insist that the statutory distinction is based on an overbroad and outdated
stereotype... and that existing administrative procedures, which had been developed
to deal with the problems of proving paternity... could easily handle the problems of
proof involved in determining the paternity of an illegitimate child. We simply note
that this argument should be addressed to the Congress.
Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799 n.9.
204. See Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1474-75 (1996) (WaldJ., concurring) (arguing
that as early as 1983 Congress had recognized that paternity testing was reliable).
205. Wauchope, 985 F.2d at 1411 ("[T]he plaintiffs have suffered a concrete in-
jury.... [m]oreover, their interests coincide with those of their mothers and are equally as in-
tense.").
206. See Standing to Assert ConstitutionalJus Tertii, supra note 156, at 425 (noting third-party
standing is not a constitutional doctrine).
207. See id. at 431. The author of this Note criticized the Court for only allowingjus tertii
standing in cases where a third party could not possibly assert his or her own rights. See id. The
Court, the author explained, thus ignored "a large category of cases in which third parties can
fully exercise their constitutional rights only through relationships with the class of persons to
which thejus tertii claimant belongs." Id.
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stitutional issue of equality between the sexes.
Additionally, there is an implied "injury to [all] American citizens
of the same... [sex] who are stigmatized by the classification."2° In
other words, legislation that discriminates against the natural fathers
of illegitimate children because "[a] mother is far less likely to ignore
the child she has carried in her womb... [and] even if conscious [of
child's birth], [the father] is very often totally unconcerned because
of the absence of any ties to the mother,, 211 is degrading not only to
fathers of illegitimate foreign-born children seeking immigration
privileges, but also to fathers of American children born out of wed-
lock. Regardless whether a citizen-parent is joined in these cases, the
alien should be able to receive the level of judicial scrutiny afforded
to citizens in the non-immigration context.
2. War babies and irresponsibility
Most petitioners who challenged the constitutionality of immigra-
tion statutes making is so difficult for the illegitimate children of
208. In Miller v. AlbrightJustice O'Connor,joined by Justice Kennedy, held that the plaintiff
had not demonstrated that her citizen-father "confronted a 'genuine obstacle' to the assertion
of his own rights" that rose to the level necessary to justify third-party standing. See Miller v. Al-
b7ight, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1443-44 (1998) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Accordingly, Justice
O'Connor reasoned that plaintiff could not assert the gender-based equal protection challenge
on behalf of her father. See id. at 1445. Therefore,Justice O'Connor reviewed the citizenship
statute under a mere rational basis analysis, noting that the government "has no obligation to
produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification," particularly"when the
classification is adopted with reference to immigration, an area where Congress frequently
must base its decisions on generalizations about groups of people." Id. at 1446. It should be
noted that O'Connor logically delineated why third-party standing was an essential considera-
tion in determining the level of scrutiny applied, whereas the lower courts described above did
not make such an analysis. Justice O'Connor admitted, however, that if the citizen-father had
been a party to the action, she would have reviewed the statute using heightened scrutiny, and
consequently found the statute unconstitutional. See id. at 1445 ("I do not share Justice Ste-
vens' assessment that the provision [in section 1409] withstands heightened scrutiny."). There-
fore, ifJustices O'Connor and Kennedy had granted Penero third-party standing on behalf of
her citizen-father, the plaintiff would have won her case by a five to four majority. See id. at
1456 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg) (arguing that third-party
standing was appropriate in this case because plaintiff had satisfied the criteria set forth in
Campbell v. Louisiana, 118 S. Ct. 1419, 1428 (1998) and Ohio v. Powers, 499 U.S. 400, 411
(1991)). Specifically, Justice Breyer explained that plaintiff had suffered an injury in fact: She
had a close relationship with her father, and her father had faced a"hindrance" that prevented
him from asserting his own rights. See Miller, 118 S.Ct. at 1456. This hindrance occurred be-
cause plaintiff's father was wrongfully dismissed from the original district court action in Texas,
and the case subsequently was transferred to the District Court for the District of Columbia.
According to Justice Breyer, "appeals take time and money; the transfer of venue left the plain-
tiffs uncertain about where to appeal; the case was being heard with Lorelyn as plaintiff in any
event; and the resulting comparison of costs and benefits (viewed prospectively) likely would
have discouraged" the father's further participation. Id.
209. Rosberg, supra note 4, at 327. Although Rosberg referred to classifications by race and
national origin, his argument is equally applicable to gender-based classifications.
210. Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1434 (internal citations omitted) (citing Miller v. Christopher, 96
F.3d 1467, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
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American citizen-fathers to immigrate to the United States were chil-
dren of American male soldiers stationed overseas. 1 In 1982, Con-
gress recognized a special immigration category for Amerasian2
children of United States citizen-soldiers born in Korea, Vietnam,
211Laos, Kampuchea, or Thailand between 1950 and 1982. Congress
passed the Amerasian Immigration Act in recognition of the uncon-
scionable economic and social discrimination these illegitimate, of-
ten homeless, children experienced in their native countries because
of their American face, as well as America's moral responsibility to its
"sons and daughters."214 The Act affords special permanent immigra-
tion visas, not citizenship, to illegitimate Amerasian children and.
makes it easier than under section 309 for these children to prove pa-
temity.21
This Comment does not argue that the relaxed standards of pater-
nity testing for Amerasian children should apply to all children born
out of wedlock abroad, or even all "war babies" born in countries that
211. See Miller, 96 F.3d at 1468 (father stationed in Philippines in the late 1960s); Ablang v.
Reno, 52 F.3d 801, 802 (9th Cir. 1995) (father stationed in Philippines during World War II);
LeBrun v. Thornburgh, 777 F. Supp. 1204, 1205 (D.N.J. 1991) (father stationed in France dur-
ing World War II); Y.T. v. Bell, 478 F. Supp. 828, 829 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (father stationed in Japan
during and following World War II).
212. Amerasians are "half-Asian, half-American children fathered by Americans while serv-
ing our country in Asia"). See 128 CONG. REC. 27, 271 (1982) (statement of Rep. Mazzoli).
213. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(f) (1994). "The Attorney General may approve a petition for an
alien under paragraph (1) if-(A) he has reason to believe that the alien (i) was born in Korea,
Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, or Thailand..., and (ii) was fathered by a United States citizen."
Id. § 1154(f) (2). At least one commentator has argued that the statute should be extended to
cover children born in the Philippines. SeeJoseph M. Ahern, Comment, Out of Sight, Out of
Mind: United States Immigration Law and Policy as Applied to Filipino-Amerasians, 1 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'YJ. 105 (1992) (arguing the INA should be amended to include Filipino-Amerasians, be-
cause they also are discriminated against because of their Caucasian appearance).
214. See 128 CONG. REc. 27,270 (1982) (statement of Rep. Mazzoli) (stating the Amerasian
Act "recognizes a moral responsibility that we have to these children who have been fathered
by Americans aboard"); 127 CONG. REc. 1327-28 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1981) (statement of Rep.
McKinney) (arguing for the passage of the Amerasian Act to benefit our"Warrior's Children").
"Warrior's Children" is the title of an article written by David Devoss. See David DeVoss,
"Warrior's Children," MONTHLY GEO., Nov. 1980, at 70-80 (1980) (describing the plight of
Amerasian children of American soldiers living in Korea). DeVoss recounted in his article the
statement of one such Amerasian child:
In America I wouldn't have any problems, explains Paul (Kwang Gyun) Shin, a sepia-
toned Amerasian who affects the swagger of the South Philadelphia dude he imagines
his father to have been. 'I could stop fighting and wouldn't have to hear the word
twigi [wild seed) every day. I love my mother, but I want my inheritance. If I have my
father's face, I should be able to live in my father's country.
Id. at 74.
215. For example, the Amerasian Act does not place an 18 year-old age limit on establishing
paternity. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(0 (1994). Moreover, rather than establishing"clear and con-
vincing" evidence of one's father's paternity as required by § 1401 (a) (1), Amerasians only need
to give the Attorney General "reason to believe" that an American is their father. See id.
§ 1154(f) (2)(A). Under the "reason to believe standard," a simple letter from a citizen-father
acknowledging the child as his own would be sufficient proof of paternity. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 204.2(g) (1996).
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do not discriminate against persons of mixed ethnicity.1 6 For the
purposes of this Comment, the Amerasian Act is described simply to
point out Congress' recognition of America's collective responsibility
to provide alien children born out of wedlock to American soldiers
the opportunity to live in the United States.2 1 7 Yet, by making tough
standards for illegitimate children of American fathers (primarily
soldiers) to immigrate, Congress, with approval from the courts,
21 8
condones the very irresponsibility it sought to remedy with the pas-
sage of the Amerasian statutes.2 9 As a policy matter, therefore, there
is no reason to subject immigration laws, classifying "one-half Ameri-
can " 220 children based on the sex of their American parent, to a lower
level of scrutiny than similar laws in a non-immigration context evinc-
ing sex-based discrimination.
III. APPLYING MID-TIER SCRUTINY TO SECTION 309 OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT
As discussed above, under a traditional mid-tier scrutiny equal pro-
tection analysis used to analyze gender-based legislation, the gov-
ernment or state has the burden of showing that the challenged stat-
ute serves an important governmental objective and that the gender-
based classification is substantially related to that objective. 2' Laws
216. The arguments for and against extending the benefits of the Amerasian Act to other
countries are outside the scope of this Comment.
217. See 128 CONG. REC. 25,340 (1982) (statement of Sen. Hayakawa) ("[W~e as a nation
have a responsibility to help these children. Whatever we do right or wrong, we are a nation
with a conscience. We chose to participate militarily in Asia and we now have a moral respon-
sibility to assist the human beings that are products ofour involvement....").
218. SeeMillerv. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1439 (1998). The Court stated that the fact that
24,000 military personnel, mostly men, were stationed in the Philippines in 1970,
coupled with the interval between conception and birth and the fact that military per-
sonnel regularly return to the United States when a tour of duty ends, suggest that
Congress had legitimate concerns about a class of children born abroad out of wed-
lock to alien mothers and to American servicemen who would not necessarily know
about or be known by, their children.
Id.; see also Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1996), af.'d on other grounds sub
nom. Miller, 118 S. Ct. 1428 (noting the sex-based distinction in § 1409 "seems especially war-
ranted where, as here, the applicant for citizenship was fathered by a U.S. serviceman while
serving a tour of duty overseas"). But see Miller, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1462-63 (BreyerJ., dissenting)
(noting that section 309's purpose was probably not to remedy the "war baby" problem because
the provision was originally adopted in the Nationality Act of 1940, before the United States
even entered World War II).
219. See supra note 217; see also LeBrun v. Thornburgh, 777 F. Supp. 1204, 1206 (D.NJ.
1991) (noting that immigration statutes that discriminate against children born out of wedlock
to American servicemen are "subject to the personal vagaries and consciences of their fa-
thers .... (A father] could defeat his child's claim to citizenship merely by delaying the recog-
nition of his responsibility").
220. See 128 CONG. REC. 25,340 (1980) (statement of Sen. Levin) (referring to Amerasian
children born of an American father and Asian mother as "one-half American").
221. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (describing mid-tier scrutiny test).
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that disadvantage men based on their sex are subject to the same
level of scrutiny as those that discriminate against women.'
According to the D.C. Circuit, the objectives of the INA at issue in
Miller v. Christopher included: (1) avoiding lurking problems with pa-
ternity testing;2 (2) recognizing the inherently closer ties that exist
between natural mothers and their foreign children born out of wed-
lock than exist between natural fathers and their foreign children
born out of wedlock;24 and (3) fostering early ties to this country.2
A. Lurking Problems with Paternity Testing
As part of the 1984 Child Support Enforcement Amendments,22
Congress required states to abolish all laws requiring a statute of limi-
tation on proof of paternity in order to continue to receive federal
funds227 Congress determined that such statutes of limitation were
no longer necessary to safeguard a man against "a paternity action
brought years after the child's birth when witnesses may have disap-
peared and memories may have become faulty" because genetic pa-
ternity testing has become so reliable.s Although the Supreme
Court had commented that "lurking problems" with paternity testing
may no longer be a rational government interest in the domestic
222. SeeMississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732-33 (1982) (ordering an all
female public nursing school to admit men on an equal basis as women); Weinberger v. Wie-
senfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975) (invalidating a law that gave more favorable Social Security
benefits to widows than widowers).
223. See Miller, 96 F.3d at 1472.
224. See id.; see also Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355 (1979) (commenting that"mothers
and fathers of illegitimate children are not similarly situated").
225. See Miller, 96 F.3d at 1472. In Miller, Justice Stevens essentially adopted the aforemen-
tioned purposes cited by the lower court. SeeMiller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1438-39 (1998).
He also suggested that section 309 was designed to reward, through the granting of citizenship,
an unmarried female's choice to give birth to her child rather than have an abortion. See id. at
1437. Justice Stevens noted that unlike an unmarried mother, an unmarried father.
need not participate in the decision to give birth rather than to choose an abortion,
he need not be present at the birth, and for at least 17 years thereafter he need not
provide any parental support, either moral or financial, to either the mother or the
child, in order to preserve his right to confer citizenship on the child pursuant to
§ 1409(a).
Id.; cf United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (noting that under mid-tier scrutiny
justifications for a statute must be "genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc"). It is un-
likely that abortion was a consideration of Congress in passing the 1952 INA, and Justice Ste-
vens cites no support for his assumption.
226. See Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Star.
1305 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (1994)).
227. See id.; Miller, 96 F.3d at 1474-75 (Wald, J., concurring) (noting that amendments re-
sulted from increased reliability of genetic testing as a method of establishing paternity).
228. See H.R. REP. No. 98-527, at 38 (1983), cited in Miller, 96 F.3d at 1474-75 (Wald, J., con-
curring). See generally Alan R. Davis, Comment, Are You My Mother? The Scientific and Legal Valid-
ity of Conventional Blood Testing and DNA Fingerprinting to Establish Proof of Parentage in Immigration
Cases, 1994 B.Y.U. L. REV. 129 (1994) (describing the reliability of several scientifically accepted
means of establishing parentage including various forms of blood testing and DNA testing).
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context,m two Justices of the Court recently decided that in the con-
text of immigration (involving international considerations) these
lurking problems were not only a rational interest, but may even be
an "important" interest. On the other hand, three Justices of the
Miller Court disagreed with Justice Stevens' analysis that the unreli-
ability of paternity testing was an "exceedingly persuasive" justifica-
tion for treating parents differently based on sex.231
B. Establishing Close Ties Between Parent and Child, and Early Ties to
This Country
On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has noted that nei-
ther the Federal Government nor the states may use stereotypes or
"overbroad generalizations" about men and women to justify a gen-
der-based classification.23 2 The D.C. Circuit, however, claimed that a
mother of a child born out of wedlock was more likely to have close
ties to her child, while a putative father might be "totally uncon-
cerned" with the child's welfare. 33 Not only is this based on stereo-
typical notions about parental suitability,2 but it contradicts the
229. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772 (1977) (concluding that problems with pa-
ternity testing cannot be "made into an impenetrable barrier that works to shield otherwise
invidious discrimination").
230. SeeMiller, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1438-39.
231. See id. at 1462 (BreyerJ., dissenting, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg) (citing E.
Donald Shapiro, et al., The DNA Paternity Test: Legislating the Future Paternity Action, 7J.L. &
HEALTH 1, 29 (1992) (noting that DNA testing provides inexpensive and reliable paternity de-
terminations).
232. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541-42 (1996) (emphasizing that the gov-
ernment may not offer "judgments about people that are likely to... perpetuate historical pat-
terns of discrimination" in order to sustain its burden under mid-tier scrutiny (quotingJ.E.B. v.
Alabama ex re. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.l1 (1994))); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982) (stating gender-based scrutiny must be applied "free of fixed no-
tions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females").
233. See Miller, 96 F.3d at 1472 (recognizing that a father may not even know of his child's
existence).
234. See id. at 1475-76 (Wald, J., concurring).
In oral arguments before the Court in Millerv. AlbrightJustice Breyer reasoned:
First let's think of the noncaretaker parents who are both citizens. They're in the
United States, the baby's over in the Philippines... why is there any reason in the
world to believe that a noncaretaker father has less of a personal tie than a noncare-
taker mother who's abandoned the child? ... Let's imagine now that both citizens are
caretakers, and what reason in the world is there to think that a caretaker mother has
more of a connection with the child than a caretaker father, who after all is trying to
bring up the child by himself* ... [I]t seems to me this distinction is irrational, or
close to it.
United States Sup. Ct. Official Tr., Miller v. Albright, No. 96-1060, 1997 WL 699809, at *40-41
(Nov. 4, 1997). Justice Breyer essentially restated this argument in his dissenting opinion in
Miller. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1461 (concluding that the gender-based classifications in §
1409(a) "depend for their validity upon the generalization that mothers are significantly more
likely than fathers to care for their children").
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premise behind Stanley v. Illinois,2 in which the Supreme Court
struck down an Illinois statute that contained an irrebuttable pre-
sumption in custody proceedings that unwed fathers who had lived
with their children were unfit parents.2
Additionally, the courts in both Miller v. Christopher and Ablang v.
Reno agreed that "a desire to promote early ties to this country and to
those relatives who are citizens of this country is not an irrational ba-
sis for the [additional] requirements" for illegitimate children of
American fathers.27 While Congress may have believed that estab-
lishing early ties to this country before a child born out of wedlock
reaches eighteen was an important governmental objective, it seems
counter-intuitive that this goal could be reached by not requiring an
alien child of an American mother born out of wedlock to establish
his or her American citizenship before reaching eighteen as well.
Thus the goal of early ties is not "substantially related" to the sex-
based classification of the statute.
Under traditional mid-tier scrutiny, therefore, the gender-based
classification of section 309 should be found unconstitutional.2
Fraudulent claims involving paternity testing are no longer important
government interests. Moreover, the alleged closer ties between a
mother and her illegitimate child than between a father and his ille-
gitimate child are premised on the same stereotypes that the Court
has rejected in the past, and thus also cannot be important govern-
mental interests. Finally, requiring an illegitimate alien child of an
American father to satisfy the criteria of section 309 and apply for
citizenship by the time he or she reaches eighteen, but not imposing
similar constraints on illegitimate alien children of American moth-
ers is not substantially related to the alleged important government
interest of promoting early ties among all illegitimate children to this
country.
235. 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (considering an equal protection challenge to Illinois statute
that presumes unwed fathers are not fit for parenthood).
236. See id. at 656-58 (holding that even if it is true that many unwed fathers are "unsuitable
and neglectful parents," that does not warrant a blanket exclusion denying all unwed fathers
the opportunity to raise their children); Susan Beth Jacobs, Note and Comment, The Hidden
Gender Bias Behind "The Best Interest of the Child" Standard in Custody Decisions, 13 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 845, 868 (1997) (noting that maternal preferences in custody battles have been abolished
in most states in favor of awarding custody to the parent that the court finds meets the best in-
terests of the child).
237. See Miller, 96 F.3d at 1472; Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d 801, 806 (9th. Cir. 1995).
238. This conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court majority in Miller v. Albright. See
supra, note 37 (noting that five of the nine justices in Miller believed that if heightened scrutiny
was applied to INA § 309 the statute would be unconstitutional).
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IV. REMEDY
A. A Remedy Based on the Least-Restrictive-Means Analysis in United
States v. Virginia
It is impossible to ignore the physical differences between mothers
and fathers involved in Congress' determination that fathers of ille-
gitimate children must meet some additional criteria to transmit
their citizenship to their foreign-born children23s Some fathers, par-




On the other hand, for mothers who give birth and invariably are
listed on the child's birth certificate, such problems rarely exist.24' It
does not follow, however, that because mothers and fathers cannot
be treated exactly equal because of these physical differences, that
the statute cannot be designed to create more "equal results" so that
American fathers and their illegitimate foreign children are not un-
necessarily punished.2 A discovery rule, as discussed below, provides
a "least-restrictive means" of accommodating fathers and their ille-
gitimate foreign-born off-spring,243 similar to the Court's remedy in
United States v. Virginia.
2 4
B. Model Legislation-Implementing A Discovery Rule
The heightened requirements for illegitimate children of Ameri-
can fathers to become American citizens do not need to be abolished
completely. Rather, the statute can "accommodate" for the physical
differences between men and women by continuing to require clear
239. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (noting that"[p]hysical differ-
ences between men and women... are enduring .... [they are] cause for celebration, but not
for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual's op-
portunity"); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355 (1979) (recognizing mothers and fathers of
illegitimate children are not necessarily similarly situated because the identity of natural father
is often unknown).
240. See Millerat 1438 (noting public records such as hospital records and birth certificates
often do not contain the name of an illegitimate child's father); id. at 1472 (stating that the sex-
based distinction between mothers and putative fathers is "especially warranted" in cases where
the father is a serviceman on an overseas tour of duty).
241. See id. at 1438; Parham, 441 U.S. at 355 n.7 (quoting Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268-69
(1978)).
242. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 106, at 854-56. Professor Kovacic-Fleischer describes
two basic types of gender equality theories. Under the equal treatment model, laws simply
must treat all women and men equally irrespective of any differences between the sexes. See id.
at 852. Alternatively, under the equal result theory, "governmental policies must recognize and
accommodate inherent differences between the sexes" because "equal treatment in the face of
these differences produces unequal results." Id. at 854.
243. See Miller, 118 S. Ct. at 1463 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting without explanation
that Congress could simply replace section 1409(a) (4) with a "knowledge-of-birth" require-
ment).
244. Seesupra Part II.D.2 (outlining least-restrictive-means remedy).
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245
and convincing proof of paternity through blood or DNA testing,
and replacing the statute of limitations currently set at eighteen years
old with a discovery rule that begins operating after the child reaches
eighteen.
For example, many states, including the District of Columbia, em-
ploy a discovery rule for exposure to toxic substances.2 6 Instead of
the statute of limitations running from the moment of exposure to a
toxic substance (of which victims are often unaware), the statute of
limitations is tolled until after a disease is discovered. 47  Similarly,
unmarried fathers, sometimes unaware of the birth of their children,
and illegitimate children born abroad, sometimes unaware of the
identity of their natural fathers, deserve this same allowance.24 The
discovery rule does not necessarily foreclose Congress' alleged desire
"to promote early ties to this country .... After the child is eight-
een and discovers the location of his or her father, Congress could
establish a reasonable length of time for completing necessary pater-
nity requirements and applying for citizenship.
CONCLUSION
The line of cases that has emerged since Fiallo v. Bel4 subjecting
gender-based discrimination to a facially legitimate scrutiny test, has
created an unsettling discrepancy between what we say and what we
do in this country.2° Recently, the Supreme Court, although pur-
portedly not applying the Fiallo test, could not reach any consensus
about how sex-based immigration or "citizenship" laws should be
analyzed. Therefore, the Court lost the opportunity to rectify the
gender-based discrimination in section 309 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, and overturn the Fiallo precedent. Regardless of
whether one is a mere "person" or a citizen of the United States chal-
lenging a sex-based immigration law, and regardless of whether a law
245. See8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (1) (1994) (stating "a blood relationship between the person and
the father is established by clear and convincing evidence").
246. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-311(a) (2) (1981) (stating the statute of limitations for injury
related to asbestos exposure must commence within a year of the time the victim knew or
should have known of his disability). See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1415 (West 1992); CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.2(a) (2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
247. SeeD.C. CODEANN. § 12-311(a) (2) (1981).
248. See Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d 801, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that requiring an ille-
gitimate child born abroad to establish the paternity of her American father before she
reached 18 was a "heavy burden").
249. See Miller v. Christopher, 96 F.3d 1467, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1996), aff'd on other grounds sub
nom., Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998) (citing Ablang, 52 F.3d at 806).
250. See H.R. REP. No. 82-1365, at 1751 (statement of Rep. Celler) (arguing the ethnic and
racial discrimination in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act "points out the gap between
what we say and what we do").
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is technically a citizenship law or an immigration law, the Court
should apply heightened scrutiny to laws that classify persons based
on gender. Accordingly, under mid-tier scrutiny section 309 is un-
constitutional. Following the Court's model in United States v. Vir-
ginia, a discovery rule added to section 309 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act would accommodate for the physical differences be-
tween men and women, without harboring outdated stereotypes
about their respective roles in society.
